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IS THE DEATH OF THE DEATH PENALTY NEAR?
THE IMPACT OF ATKINS AND ROPER ON THE
FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR

MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS
Helen Shin*
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has created two categorical
exemptions to the death penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court exempted
mentally retarded offenders. Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the
Court extended the protection to juveniles. Based on these cases, the
practices of foreign countries, and the opinions of professional
organizations with relevant expertise, legal scholars speculate that the
Court may, in the future, categorically exclude severely mentally ill
offenders from the death penalty. This Note examines the feasibility of such
an exemptionfor the mentally ill and considers its possible repercussions.
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholar Herbert Packer once wrote, "[T]he law treats man's
conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is
desirable to proceed as if it were." For offenders suffering from severe
mental illnesses which at times cause them to be incapable of controlling
their actions, the law's treatment of their conduct as deliberate for the sake
of judicial convenience or to avoid complication is an injustice. It
inadequately addresses an individual's uniqueness and posits intent where
there may be none. Advances in psychiatry and psychology in the past
several decades have revealed that certain severe mental illnesses render
individuals who suffer from them powerless to control their own thoughts
and/or behavior.2 Moreover, such people are often not even aware that they

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, Barnard College. I
would like to thank Professor Alison Nathan for her insight and guidance during the writing
process, as well as the tremendously helpful minilessons on the small whiteboard in her
office. I am also grateful to my family and friends for their endless love, support, and
encouragement.
1. Laura Mansnerus, Damaged Brains and the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, July 21,
2001, at B 11 (quoting Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 74-75 (1968), in
a discussion of the developments in the study of brain dysfunction by psychiatrist Dorothy
0. Lewis, who evaluated dozens of people on death row and discovered that almost all of
them had damaged brains).
2. See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 276 (4th ed. 1994) (stating that psychotic symptoms of people who suffer from
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are ill. 3 Recently, legislatures and courts have crafted and interpreted laws
in a manner that reveals their respect for, and recognition of, the validity of
the mental health sciences-psychiatry and psychology-often relying on
the two related disciplines in enacting legislation 4 and
developments in
5
cases.
deciding
Over the past twenty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has made several
landmark decisions regarding mental capacity and capital punishment. 6 In
1986, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty on capital
prisoners who are "insane" and thus not competent for execution. 7 Within
the past five years, the Court further determined that mentally retarded
defendants 8 and juveniles 9 are categorically precluded from the death
penalty. In this way, the Supreme Court carved out exemptions for
different groups of criminal defendants from the death penalty. Therefore,
in light of these decisions, as well as developments in the Court's
understanding of psychiatry and psychology, legal scholars speculate' 0 that
mentally ill defendants may join the list of people who are categorically
protected from being executed. 1
schizophrenia substantially impair their ability to think and behave appropriately, sometimes
causing them to act bizarrely, become agitated, or speak incoherently).
3. See Stefano Pallanti et al., Awareness of Illness and Subjective Experience of
Cognitive Complaints in Patients with Bipolar I and Bipolar JI Disorder, 156 Am. J.
Psychiatry 1094, 1095 (1999) (stating that one trait of people with bipolar II disorder is poor
awareness of their own mental illness).
4. For example, in light of scholarship in the field of mental health, Congress
recognized that mental illness is a valid disability when it passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213) (2000)). Another example is a Florida statute that requires a panel of three
psychiatrists to determine the mental competency of a death row inmate "to understand the
nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him" when it appears
that the death row inmate may be insane. Fla. Stat. § 922.07(l)-(2) (1985).
5. A Florida statute, Fla. Stat. § 922.07(2) (1985), and the expertise of mental health
professionals was relevant in Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), a death penalty case
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the governor decided to permit the
defendant's execution without explanation, he complied with the state's procedural statute
and required three psychiatrists to evaluate the sanity of a death row inmate. Ford,477 U.S.
at 403-04, 412-13. In Ford, the Supreme Court ultimately decided to ban executions of
capital offenders who are found to be insane. See generally 477 U.S. at 399-418.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 46-60; Part I.B. 1-2.
7. Ford,477 U.S. 399; see also supra note 5.
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10. See also Dora W. Klein, CategoricalExclusions from Capital Punishment: How
Many Wrongs Make a Right?, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 1211 (2007) (discussing more expansively
the effects of categorical death penalty exclusions). This Note focuses more narrowly on the
category of mentally ill offenders.
11. For a definition of "mental illness" in the context of the death penalty, see infra Part
I.C.1. Both law and science recognize "mental illness" and "mental retardation" as two
distinct classifications. While they share certain similar traits and symptoms, fundamental
differences distinguish them from each other. Importantly, the Supreme Court has only
banned the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. There are two
major differences: (1) the determination of whether a person is mentally retarded involves
an intelligence inquiry while intelligence is an irrelevant factor in determining whether a

2007]

ATKINS, ROPER, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

467

The legal community and the American public have long held strong
opinions about the death penalty. Following the 2002 Atkins v. Virginia
decision, in which the Supreme Court ruled that sentencing mentally
retarded criminals to death violated the Constitution, 12 law journals and the
media devoted much attention to the question of whether the Court's ban on
executions of mentally retarded offenders could apply similarly to mentally
ill offenders.' 3
Since Atkins, there have been several relevant and
significant developments in the legal arena that shed light on what may lie
ahead for mentally ill criminals. The most significant advance in capital
punishment jurisprudence after Atkins came in 2005 when the Supreme
Court ruled against the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in
Roper v. Simmons.' 4 This Note applies the analysis used by the Court in
Roper and Atkins to scrutinize the constitutionality of sanctioning
executions of severely mentally ill offenders in light of new developments
in the law and science. Furthermore, this Note considers what impact a
categorical exemption for the mentally ill may have on the ongoing
controversial debate about the overall validity of the death penalty.
In response to Atkins and Roper, experts in the legal community 15 and
relevant professional organizations, such as the American Psychiatric
Association,' 6 have voiced their opinions in reports, position statements,
person suffers from a mental illness; and (2) the time of onset differs for mental retardation
versus mental illness-mental retardation is a permanent condition which mainly arises in
infancy and must be present by the time a person turns eighteen, whereas mental illness can
be diagnosed at any age with many episodes of more severe mental illnesses (e.g.,
schizophrenia) occurring in adulthood. For a detailed discussion regarding how mental
illness differs from mental retardation, see infra text accompanying notes 193-200.
In addition, this Note discusses the definition of "insanity" (or rather, the difficulty of
defining the term) and distinguishes it from "mental illness" in relation to the death penalty.
See infra text accompanying notes 201-20. The relevant distinction here, is that the
Supreme Court's ban on executing the "insane" applies to criminals who have already been
sentenced to death but are found to be mentally incompetent at the time of the execution; the
subject of this Note, however, is an offender's mental condition at the time of the offense.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 205-07.
12. See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
13. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non- Willing: Atkins,
the Volitionally Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 93 (2003);
Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L.
Rev. 293 (2003); Laurie T. Izutsu, Note, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to CapitalDefendants
with Severe Mental Illness, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 995 (2005); see also infra text accompanying
notes 193-200 (discussing the differences between mental retardation and mental illness).
14. See generally 543 U.S. 551.
15. See, e.g., ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities et al.,
Recommendation 122A (2006) [hereinafter ABA Recommendation 122A], available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/122A.pdf (calling for states to end the practice of
executing or sentencing to death mentally ill defendants who are significantly limited in their
intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior, or those defendants who have severe mental
disorders or disabilities).
16. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Death Sentences for Persons with Dementia or
Traumatic
Brain
Injury:
Position
Statement
(2005),
available
at
http://www.psych.org/edu/otherres/libarchives/archives/200508.pdf;
Am.
Psychiatric
Ass'n, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Position Statement (2005), available at
http://www.psych.org/edu/other _res/libarchives/archives/200505.pdf,
see
also
Am.
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and essays, which specifically address issues regarding execution of the
mentally ill. In addition, national, international, and foreign groups have
17
expressed concerns about the United States' stance on the death penalty.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups have also
weighed in on whether mentally disabled defendants should be eligible for
death sentences, 18 as well as on the broader debate about the overall
legitimacy of the death penalty. 19 Devotion to this issue is due in large part
to the alarming number of mentally ill death row inmates, 20 which raises
concerns among not only human rights groups, but among professional
mental health organizations, the legal community, 2 1 and the American
22
public.
Many scholars have considered the impact of Atkins on the future of
capital punishment in the United States with respect to mentally ill
defendants, 2 3 presumably because the body of knowledge about mental
retardation is related in several ways to that of mental illness. Roper, which
Psychiatric Ass'n, Diminished Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: Position Statement
(2004), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other-res/libarchives/archives/200406.pdf.
Furthermore, prior to the Atkins and Roper decisions, the American Psychological
Association also set forth a resolution calling for a moratorium on carrying out death penalty
sentences in the United States. One reason the American Psychological Association gave for
the moratorium was that "death penalty prosecutions may involve persons with serious
mental illness or mental retardation" and "[p]rocedural problems, such as assessing
competency, take on particular importance in cases where the death penalty is applied to
such populations." Am. Psychological Ass'n, The Death Penalty in the United States (Aug.
2001), http://www.apa,.org/pi/deathpenalty.html.
17. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, How the Death Penalty Weakens U.S.
International Interests 5 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/idp-report.pdf
(discussing the influence of international opinions against imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded defendants on the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002)); see also Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights
Res. 1999/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999).
18. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: The Execution of Mentally Ill
Offenders, at 170-88, Al Index AMR 51/003/2006, Jan. 31, 2006; Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the United States (2005),
http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/10617pub20050131 .html.
19. See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17.
20. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 18 (revealing that five to ten percent of
death row inmates have a serious mental illness, and according to a study by a professor of
psychiatry at New York University, almost all death row inmates had damaged brains due to
trauma or illness); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 20 (estimating that five to ten
percent of death row inmates suffer from serious mental illness).
21. See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Introduction to the Presentations: The Path to an
Eighth Amendment Analysis of Mental Illness and Capital Punishment, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev.
1117 (2005) (introducing the topic of the symposium, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness,
and explaining that the Supreme Court and the entire country is reevaluating the death
penalty in light of recent findings of inexcusable mistakes and injustices as well as a greater
understanding of mental illness).
22. See, e.g., Kevin Drew, Executed Mentally Ill Inmate Heard Voices Until End,
CNN.com,
Jan.
6,
2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/06/singleton.death.row/index.html (telling the story of a
mentally ill man who was executed in Arkansas, and noting that although Americans
generally support the death penalty, public opinion is divided with regard to executing the
mentally ill).
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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only three years after Atkins carved out a second group of peoplejuveniles-who were excluded from the death penalty, led people to
wonder whether the Supreme Court was beginning a wave of categorically
exempting certain groups of offenders from capital punishment in order to
of narrowly confining the death penalty to
adhere to its long-held principle
24
the most serious criminals.
Given the significant changes and developments in not only this nation's
death penalty jurisprudence due to Atkins and Roper, but also the practices
of foreign countries and the opinions of numerous professional
organizations with germane expertise, the field is ripe for speculation about
the future of the death penalty in the United States. This Note's
examination of these recent developments seeks to add a fresh perspective
to the debate about the applicability of the death penalty to the narrow class
of severely mentally ill defendants.
Part L.A of this Note begins by examining the relevant legal history of
capital punishment in the United States and explains the Supreme Court's
rationale for upholding the death penalty as a legitimate form of
Additionally, this section offers examples of capital
punishment.
defendants with mental illnesses to provide a human aspect to the
controversy, and to illustrate how existing laws and past precedent are
inadequate legal safeguards for mentally ill defendants in American
courts.

25

Part I.B discusses two recent Supreme Court death penalty cases-Atkins
and Roper. These cases provide the substantive background for this Note's
assertion that the country is moving in the direction of creating categorical
exemptions to the death penalty for certain groups, although it is
questionable whether these carve outs are helpful in advancing the interests
of death penalty opponents. The cases also set forth the Supreme Court's
criteria for creating an exemption to the death penalty for a particular class
of offenders. The requirements promulgated by the Court in Roper and
Atkins provide the framework through which this Note scrutinizes the
applicability of the death penalty to mentally ill offenders in Parts II and III.
Part I.C defines mental illness as it relates to capital punishment
inquiries. In defining mental illness, this section relies on definitions
promulgated by experts in the mental health profession and established
mental health organizations. Furthermore, this section distinguishes mental

24. See generally Nicola Browne et al., Capital Punishment and Mental Health Issues:

Global Examples, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 383 (2006); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B.
Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 351 (2006);
Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate an

Aggravating Situation, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 283 (2006); Brian W. Varland, Marking
the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death Penalty
Application in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 Hamline L. Rev. 311 (2005).

25. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 170-88 (listing names and short profiles of 100
mentally ill prisoners who have been executed in the United States since reinstating capital
punishment in 1977).
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illness-which is the subject of this Note-from mental retardation and
insanity, which have been previously addressed by the Supreme Court.
Part II applies the test the Supreme Court used in Roper and Atkins to
analyze whether or not mentally ill criminals should, or reasonably could,
also be a category that is protected from the death penalty as a matter of
law. Employing the test, Part II.A questions if there is a national consensus
about whether the death penalty is still permissible in this country for
mentally ill defendants.
In examining whether there is a domestic
consensus or at least a trend toward abolishing the death penalty for the
mentally ill, this Note provides an overview of relevant state capital
punishment laws existing in the United States. 26 Furthermore, this section
discusses what Americans, specifically jurors, judges, and legislatorsthrough their jury decisions, practices of courts in general, and state
legislation-as well as the international community have voiced in the
recent past regarding executions of mentally ill defendants. This section
also summarizes medical, legal, and academic scholarship disseminated by
experts in recent years, particularly the views and recommendations they
have put forth in light of Atkins and Roper. Such information provides a
more complete understanding of whether a consensus exists about this issue
upon which courts and legislatures can act. In view of the overwhelming
opposition to capital punishment from the world community and
professional mental health and legal organizations, as well as the more
ambivalent opinion of the American public as evidenced in popular polls,
this Note examines whether such opinions carry any actual weight in
American courts and state legislatures.
Part II.B shifts focus to the proportionality analysis the Supreme Court
used in Roper27 and Atkins 2 8 to determine whether a particular
punishment-here, the death penalty-is appropriate for the crime
committed and the particular criminal. Specifically, it examines whether
the goals of deterrence and retribution are met by permitting executions of
mentally ill defendants.
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the Roper and Atkins
decisions on the information provided in Parts II.A-B. Specifically, this
Note argues that there is a growing national and international consensus
against subjecting mentally ill defendants to capital punishment. While
such a consensus is already present in the foreign arena and among legal,
mental health, and medical experts, the laws in this country have not yet
26. Such a survey is necessary because each state creates its own rules limiting capital
punishment. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986) (stating that the
Supreme Court "leave[s] to the State the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction [on inflicting the death penalty on the insane] upon its execution of
sentences").
27. See 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 162-66
(examining the Court's proportionality review in Roper).
28. See 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002); see also infra text accompanying notes 99-106
(discussing the Court's examination of the deterrent and retributive effects of the death
penalty on mentally retarded persons).
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caught up to science and the rest of the world, impeding a clear domestic
consensus on the issue. However, this Note urges courts and lawmakers to
stay abreast of "evolving standards of decency" 29-as the Supreme Court
did in Roper and Atkins to determine whether the death penalty is so
disproportionate as to be deemed cruel and unusual, as reflected in
contemporary international and foreign consensus, and as articulated by
modem, relevant communities of legal and mental health experts. Doing so
will further limit the reach of the death penalty when society no longer
tolerates such a punishment for the mentally ill. The Note opines that the
rumblings in the international community and among professional
organizations with germane expertise against permitting executions of
mentally ill offenders are evidence that the time is drawing near for the
barring of such executions. Importantly, however, this Note recognizes that
the Supreme Court most heavily relied on death penalty legislation of
individual states to provide the primary evidence for the existence of a
national consensus concerning mentally retarded and juvenile defendants at
the time of the Atkins and Roper decisions. As such, the Note concludes
that such an objective legislative multistate consensus is not yet visible with
respect to mentally ill offenders. This Note therefore recommends that state
legislatures that still sanction capital punishment consider whether
executing mentally ill defendants comports with the standards set forth in
these two Supreme Court decisions. After states supporting the death
penalty critically examine the constitutionality of their legislation
concerning execution of the mentally ill in light of Atkins and Roper, those
that determine that such punishment is improper must accordingly alter
their laws. If enough states change their laws and there is consistency in
the states' direction of change such that a national legal consensus does
appear, the Supreme Court will likely be compelled by "evolving standards
of decency" to make a national decision to categorically exclude the
mentally ill from the death penalty.
The Note concludes by hypothesizing about what effect a ban on
executions of the mentally ill would have on the goals of death penalty
advocates and opponents. Presumably, opponents would consider it a
victory and a shift toward total abolition if the law took a bite out of the
death penalty by categorically excluding mentally ill offenders. Based on
similar reasoning, it would seem that death penalty supporters would dislike
the additional restriction. Counterintuitively, however, this Note suggests
that death penalty proponents may perceive an exemption for the severely
mentally ill as evidence that whatever flaws there may have been before in
death penalty laws have been identified and fixed, and that the potential for
unfair executions are thereby eliminated. In the long run, the exclusion of
yet another class of people from the death penalty, by acting as a safeguard,
may actually make capital punishment a more strongly rooted institution in
this country.
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE DEFINITION OF MENTAL ILLNESS
A.

Overview of the Death Penalty in the United States

1. The History of the Death Penalty
The Eighth Amendment, which was added to the U.S. Constitution in
1791,30 succinctly prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishments" and "excessive" sanctions, 3 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment
applies this provision to the states. 3 2 In Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Earl
Warren set forth the guiding constitutional principle that the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 33 He also
emphasized that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man." 34 The plurality's deference to
"evolving standards of decency" in the Trop decision eventually became the
framework the Court used to decide several landmark death penalty cases in
35
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
In 1972, the Supreme Court effectively placed a moratorium on the death
penalty when, in Furman v. Georgia, it reviewed the country's use of
capital punishment and held existing state death penalty statutes

30. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 7.
31. U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
32. U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
33. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (using this principle to decide that the
Eighth Amendment prevented the government from punishing a native-born American for
military desertion during wartime by depriving him of his national citizenship). Although
Trop was not a death penalty case, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the logic from
Trop of looking to "evolving standards of decency" in capital punishment cases. See, e.g.,
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
34. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
35. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (banning execution of juveniles under the age of
eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (ruling that mentally retarded defendants could not be
executed); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (deciding that there was not a sufficient
national consensus to bar imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants);
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit the execution of sixteen- or seventeen-year-old defendants); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that defendants fifteen years of age or younger
could not be sentenced to death); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (banning
executions of insane criminals); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (outlawing the
death penalty for accomplices to murder where the defendant did not intend bodily harm and
did not show reckless indifference to human life); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(banning the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult because such a punishment
would be impermissibly excessive); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the
death penalty was per se constitutional and lifting the moratorium on the death penalty);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (placing
a moratorium on the death penalty).
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unconstitutional. 36 Three of the five Justices in the majority argued that
application of the death penalty in an "arbitrary" and haphazard manner that
disproportionately discriminated against certain minority groups was
unconstitutional. 37 The two other Justices in the majority maintained that
capital punishment was unconstitutional per se, in all cases and not just in
cases where its application was "arbitrary. '3 8 Notably, Justice William
Brennan, Jr., used the "evolving standards of decency" principle in this case
to support his argument that the death penalty wholly violated the
Constitution because it was cruel and unusual in all cases. 39 Moreover,
Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that
[p]erhaps the most important principle in analyzing 'cruel and unusual'
punishment questions is one that is reiterated again and again in the prior
opinions of the Court: i.e., the cruel and unusual language 'must draw its
meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of
40
a maturing society.'
He further noted that a penalty that was permissible at one point in the
country's history "is not necessarily permissible today," 4 1 recognizing the
elastic nature of an analysis of "evolving standards of decency."
In light of the Furman decision, which effectively voided forty death
penalty statutes and commuted the sentences of 629 death row inmates
around the nation,42 state legislatures began revising their capital
punishment statutes and proposing new statutes that sought to rectify the
problems identified by the Court in Furman.4 3 Four years later, the
Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg
v. Georgia.44 It determined that Georgia's newly revised capital statutes
36. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
37. Id. at 240, 242, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice William 0. Douglas stated
that "[i]t would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is
'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices." Id. at 242; see id. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11, 313-14
(White, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358-60, 369-71 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
39. Id. at 269-305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (creating a cumulative test with four
principles to determine whether a punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, and
including as the third principle, whether contemporary society has objectively indicated its
acceptance of the punishment); see also Varland, supra note 24, at 317-20 (discussing the
Furman case).
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Chief Justice Earl
Warren's plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
41. Id. at 329.
42. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Part I: History of the Death Penalty: Introduction to the
Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 15&did=410 (last visited
Aug. 26, 2007) [hereinafter DPIC Introduction to the Death Penalty].
43. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 7; DPIC Introduction to the Death Penalty,
supra note 42 (stating that Florida led the states in rewriting death penalty laws in response
to Furman and that thirty-four other states also drafted new death penalty legislation and
sentencing guidelines to eliminate the problems discussed in Furman).
44. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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now passed constitutional muster, in effect reopening the door for states to
45
resume sentencing executions.
Ten years later, detecting another flaw with capital punishment laws, the
Supreme Court held in Ford v. Wainwright that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from carrying out the death penalty on defendants who are
insane. 46 The majority decided that such punishment was "cruel and
unusual" according to common law, stating that the Eighth Amendment
proscribed "barbarous methods" condemned in 1789 at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted 4 7 as well as violations of "fundamental human dignity"
based on contemporary values.48 The Court noted several historical
theories for why the common law did not condone the practice of executing
the insane (e.g., "offends humanity," "madness is its own punishment," it
has49no proper deterrent or retributive value, religion and/or morals forbid
it), and pointed out that all the states adhered to the principle of not
executing the insane. 5 0 The fact that no states permitted the execution of
insane prisoners provided ample evidence that the Eighth Amendment
effectively prohibits states from carrying out a death sentence upon an
insane defendant. 5' However, the Court left it to the individual states to
determine the definition of competence for execution and the procedures
they should use to assess whether a prisoner meets the standard of
52
insanity.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court decided that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments further forbid the imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of sixteen at the time of their
crime. 53 The Court discussed state legislation, the practice of juries, the
number of actual executions, the opinions of professional organizations, as
45. Id. at 207. The first execution following the moratorium occurred on January 17,
1977, when Utah executed Gary Gilmore by firing squad. DPIC Introduction to the Death
Penalty, supra note 42 (noting that Gilmore did not challenge his death sentence). The same

year, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection as a method of execution. Id.
46. Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
47. Id. at 405-06 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)).

48. Ford,477 U.S. at 406 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).

49. Id. at 407-08 (mentioning various sources that may provide the reason for the
English common law forbidding executions of the insane).
50. Id. at 407-10.
51. Id. at 409-10 (stating that the Eighth Amendment supports such a limitation
regardless of whether its purpose is to protect the insane capital defendant "from fear and
pain without comfort of understanding" or to protect society's dignity "from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance."). Id. at 410.
52. Id. at 416-17; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 121 (stating that the Ford
Court failed to provide standards and procedures for determining whether a prisoner was
insane).
53. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (setting aside the death sentence that
had been imposed on the fifteen-year-old defendant). Looking at the standards of decency at
the time, the Court noted that sixteen was the lowest age specified as permissible in death
penalty states that set a minimum age requirement. Id. at 826-29.
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well as the views of "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,
and... leading members of the Western European community" to explain
54
why it was compelled to reach such a conclusion.
The following year on the same day, the Supreme Court decided two
56
55
capital punishment cases-Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh.
In Stanford, the Court relied on the facts that 22 of the 37 death penalty
states allowed 16-year-old offenders to be sentenced to death and that 25 of
the 37 states permitted it for 17-year-old offenders to conclude that a
national consensus did not exist about the issue of executing 16- and 17year-old offenders. 57 Moreover, a plurality of the Court rejected the
suggestion that the Justices' judgment should bear on whether juvenile
executions were acceptable. 58 The Court decided in Penry that mentally
retarded offenders should not be exempt from receiving death sentences
under the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, noting that the
legislative lay of the land did not provide sufficient evidence of a national
59
consensus against it.
The Court found it persuasive that, at the time of its
decision in 1989, only two states had enacted legislation making it illegal to
sentence mentally retarded persons to death and only fourteen states
60
outlawed capital punishment altogether.
In the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court closely analyzed the
protections provided by the Eighth Amendment. Likewise, the issue
examined in this Note-whether the law as it has evolved still permits the
imposition of capital punishment on mentally ill offenders-is grounded in
an interpretation of the constitutional ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment."61
2. Mentally Ill Defendants on Death Row
Although mentally retarded and juvenile offenders are now categorically
shielded from receiving the death penalty, there are still many death row
prisoners who suffer from severe mental illnesses and/or brain damage, and
act under states of delusion or hallucination. Furthermore, many of them
come from backgrounds of poverty, child abuse, racism, deprivation, and
societal marginalization-factors that may have affected them at the time
they committed their crimes. 62 Although such factors can be considered
54. Id. at 826-33.
55. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). However, less than twenty years later, the Court overruled
Stanford in Roper.
56. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Atkins abrogated the Penry decision after just thirteen years.
57. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
58. See id. at 377-78 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White & Kennedy, JJ.).
59. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
60. Id.
61. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
62. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 170-88 (listing 100 people who have been
executed since 1977 who had mental health problems, including some with additional
neurological, social, or developmental problems). For example, Morris Mason committed a

capital murder after having unsuccessfully asked his parole officer twice in the previous
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mitigating factors, the absolute protection afforded to juveniles and the
mentally retarded against the death penalty has not been afforded to
mentally ill criminals as a matter of law. In light of the recent
developments regarding capital punishment, it is appropriate to take a fresh
look at how such changes may affect mentally ill offenders.
B. Twenty-First-CenturyDevelopments in Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
The Supreme Court's Two CategoricalExemptions
Following the decisions discussed in Part I.A.1, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to two cases to reexamine issues it had decided less than
twenty years earlier. In 1989, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
neither prohibited executing persons with mental retardation 63 nor banned
imposing the death penalty on defendants for crimes committed by sixteen
or seventeen year olds. 64 Then, in 2002, the Court revisited the issue of
whether it was still constitutional to impose the death penalty on mentally
retarded defendants in Atkins. Shortly thereafter, in 2005, the Court also
reviewed whether the Eighth Amendment permitted executing juveniles
under eighteen years of age in Roper. In both Atkins and Roper, the
Supreme Court limited the scope of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment, categorically excluding certain narrow classes of persons from
5
its reach. 6

week for help for his alcohol and drug abuse problem. Id. at 170. He had even asked to be
placed in a halfway house on the eve of the murder but no such facilities were available in
the state. Id. Mason had a long history of mental illness, including paranoid schizophrenia,
and had spent time in three different state mental institutions. Id. Also, in the eight years
before his 1978 trial, three different psychiatrists had independently diagnosed Mason with
paranoid schizophrenia, but he was nevertheless executed in 1985. Id.
In the same year, a manic depressive man named Charles Rumbaugh was executed in
Texas for committing murder during a robbery shortly after escaping from a mental
institution where he was receiving treatment for his illness. Id. He had given up on his
appeals and had given up on trying to get treatment for his illness-essentially choosing to
die. Id.
Texas executed another man, Troy Kunkle, in 2005 for a crime he committed when he
was just over eighteen years old. Id. at 187-88. He did not have a criminal record but had
been abused as a child by his mentally ill parents; his father had been physically abusive and
had severe mood swings, and his mother had neglected him. Id. The prosecution in the case
used Kunkle's problems at school, which occurred at the same time his father was abusing
him, to convince the jury to impose the death penalty. Id. at 187. A psychologist determined
post-conviction that Kunkle suffered from schizophrenia and that much of his childhood
behavioral problems were related to his mother's neglect and his father's psychotic and
aggressive conduct toward him. Id. at 187-88. Alarmingly, the psychologist also stated that
an expert evaluation at the trial would have likely revealed Kunkle's mental disorder, but the
jury never heard any expert testimony. Id. at 188.
These stories illustrate the need for lawmakers and courts to seriously consider the effects
of mental illnesses on criminal defendants facing the death penalty.
63. Penry, 492 U.S. 302.
64. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
65. See infra Part I.B.
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1. Atkins Bans Execution of Mentally Retarded Offenders
a. Facts and Background

In Atkins, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Daryl Renard Atkins,
who had been sentenced to death for abduction, armed robbery, and capital
murder. 66 Along with an accomplice, he kidnapped and robbed a man
while armed with a semiautomatic handgun. 67 Atkins and his accomplice
drove the victim to an ATM, where cameras recorded them withdrawing
cash, before taking him to an isolated location where they shot and killed
68
him.
In the penalty phase of Atkins's trial, a forensic psychologist testified
that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded, basing that conclusion on
interviews with people who knew Atkins, school and court records, and a
standard intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins had an IQ score of
fifty-nine. 69 The psychologist also stated that mental retardation occurs in
only about one percent of the population. 70 Nevertheless, the jury
sentenced Atkins to death in two separate sentencing hearings, and the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision. 7 1 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the propriety of executing
mentally retarded defendants in light of dramatic changes in state
legislation since Penry72 and the concerns of the dissenting judges in the
73
lower court.

b. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Court began by setting forth the Eighth Amendment principle that
punishment for a crime should be "'graduated and proportioned to [the]
66. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 308-09. In a footnote, the Supreme Court explained its reliance on the
definitions of mental retardation set forth by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) and The American Psychiatric Association. The AAMR defines
mental retardation as "substantial limitations in present functioning ... characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related
limitations in two or more of the following... communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work. [It] manifests before age 18." Id. at 308 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court also cited the American Psychiatric Association's definition of mental retardation,
which is nearly identical to the AAMR's definition except that it also adds that "mild mental
retardation" typically describes people with an IQ score of approximately fifty to seventy.
Id. (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
42-43 (4th ed. 2000)).
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
71. Id. at 309-10.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing Penry, in which the Court
first considered the question and held that imposing the death penalty on a mentally retarded
criminal was not unconstitutional).
73. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
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offense.' 74
The Court further explained that this concept of
proportionality has been repeatedly applied in Eighth Amendment cases
and that the determination of whether a punishment is excessive is judged
by currently prevailing standards rather than those that existed at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted. 75 The Supreme Court asserted that
proportionality analysis under evolving standards should be based mainly
on objective factors. 76 The Court explained that "'the clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures.' 77 However, the Court clarified that,
while objective evidence is of great importance in the analysis, it does not
wholly determine the issue because "'the Constitution contemplates that in
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."'' 78 In
other words, even if a consensus exists, the Court can still rely on its own
judgment and question whether there are reasons to disagree with the
79
prevailing opinion.
Using the analysis discussed above, the Court first reviewed the
legislative landscape to determine whether a national consensus existed
with respect to executions of mentally retarded offenders, and noted the
vast changes that had occurred since its decision in Penry.80 Significantly,
at the time Penry was decided, only two states that sanctioned the death
penalty had banned the execution of mentally retarded criminals, but since
then sixteen more states had also made the practice illegal. 8 1 Moreover,
rather than simply the number of states that had made the change, the Court
found it significant that there was a "consistency of the direction of
change." 82 The Court also relied on the fact that legislatures that had
addressed the issue had voted overwhelmingly in favor of prohibiting such

74. Id. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910), in which the Supreme Court held that a twelve-year jail sentence with hard and

painful labor was excessive for the crime of falsifying records).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (quoting
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980))).
77. Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
78. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
79. See id. at 313. In Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent, he sharply criticizes the majority
for assuming that the Justices have the power of independent examination in Eighth
Amendment issues. Id. at 348-49. In addition, he states his belief that the majority based its
decision more on the Justices' own "feelings and intuition" rather than an actual consensus.
Id. Scholars have criticized this aspect of the majority's opinion as well. See generally J.
Richard Broughton, Essay, The Second Death of CapitalPunishment, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 639
(2006).

80. See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17.
81. Id. at 314-15. A total of thirty states prohibited executing mentally retarded
criminals; twelve of those states had banned the death penalty altogether and eighteen
maintained it but exempted the mentally retarded. Id. at 313-15. Furthermore, no states had
passed laws reinstating the power to execute mentally retarded defendants. Id. at 315-16.
82. Id. at 315.
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sentences, and even in states that still allowed them, the practice was rare. 83
The Court thus stated that current legislation and practices provided
"powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded
'84
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.
Justice John Paul Stevens, delivering the majority opinion, stated that the
practice of executing mentally retarded offenders had "become truly
unusual," and that it was "fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it." 85
Significantly, in addition to a legislative
consensus, there was also a social, professional, and international consensus
against imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders that
provided further support for the Court's conclusion. 86 Justice Stevens
addressed the relevance of the opinions of "organizations with germane
expertise," 87 "widely diverse religious communities," 88 "world community"
practices, 89 and "polling data." 90 He concluded that, while such "factors
are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative evidence
lends further support to [the] conclusion that there is a consensus among
those who have addressed the issue." 9 1
The majority pointed out that the only issue about which there was some
disagreement was how to determine which offenders are actually mentally
retarded. 9 2 Because not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will
be "so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders
83. Id. at 315-16. For example, executions had not been carried out for decades in New
Jersey and New Hampshire although the law still sanctioned them. Id. at 316. Furthermore,
even among states that continued executions with no prohibition regarding the mentally
retarded, only five states had executed criminals with IQs under seventy since the Penry
decision. Id. at 316 & n.20.
84. Id. at 315-16.
85. Id. at 316.
86. Id. at 316 n.21. Justice John Paul Stevens stated that the "legislative judgment"
upon which the Court relies to determine the existence of a national consensus "reflects a
much broader social and professional consensus." Id.
87. Id. The relevant professional and social organizations the Supreme Court cited as
having "adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a
mentally retarded offender" include such groups as the American Psychological Association
and the AAMR, which filed amici curiae briefs. Id.
88. Id. Religious communities "reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist

traditions" also filed an amicus curiae brief "explaining that even though their views about
the death penalty differ, they all 'share a conviction that the execution of persons with

mental retardation cannot be morally justified."' Id. (quoting Brief for United States Catholic
Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533
U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727)).
89. Id. Justice Stevens observed that there was widespread disapproval within the world
community of imposing the death penalty on criminals with mental retardation. Id. (citing
Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver, 533 U.S. 975
(No. 00-8727)).

90. Id. Polling data revealed a widespread consensus among Americans, even among
supporters of the death penalty, that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded
offenders was wrong. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 317 (noting that Virginia disputes the claim that Daryl Renard Atkins is

mentally retarded).
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about whom there is a national consensus," 93 the Court gave individual
states the responsibility to develop proper means to enforce the ban on
94
executing mentally retarded criminals.
The Court then examined the merits of the consensus against executing
the mentally retarded, observing that it "reflects widespread judgment about
the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship
between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the
death penalty. '9 5 The Court reasoned that mentally retarded defendants
should not be given the death penalty because they have diminished
capacity to conform their behavior to the requirements of the law. 9 6 The
Court stated that "by definition they have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others." 9 7 As such, the
Court held that the personal culpability of such defendants was also
98
diminished and warranted a categorical exclusion from the death penalty.
Additionally, the Court provided two more reasons for its holding. First,
it was doubtful that deterrence and retribution (justifications supporting the
death penalty) were applicable to mentally retarded offenders. 99 The goal
of retribution is to punish an offender appropriately depending on his or her
culpability, 0 0 and the death penalty must therefore be imposed narrowly
for only the "most serious crimes."10 1 Because of the decreased culpability
of mentally retarded offenders,' 0 2 the Court reasoned that they did not merit
the most severe of punishments as retribution. 0 3 With regard to deterrence,
which seeks to prevent prospective offenders from committing capital
crimes, the theory is that the severity of the death penalty will inhibit
potential criminals from engaging in capitally criminal acts. 10 4 However,
the Court reasoned that the cognitive and behavioral difficulties of the
mentally retarded make it less likely that they will understand the
10 5
possibility of execution and control their behavior accordingly.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 318-21.
97. Id. at 318.
98. Id. at 318-19 (noting, however, that the impairments of mentally retarded criminals
did not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions entirely).
99. Id. at 318-21. If permitting executions of mentally retarded criminals would not
"'measurably contribute[] to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an unconstitutional
punishment."' Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (citation
omitted)).
100. Id.
101. Id. This has been part of the Court's jurisprudence since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). Id.
102. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
103. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
104. Id. at 319-20.

105. Id. at 320. Moreover, the Court believed that the exemption would not lessen the
deterrent effect the death penalty would have on criminals who are not mentally retarded. Id.
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Therefore, the Court stated that the goals of retribution and deterrence were
not achieved by allowing the death penalty for mentally retarded
06
offenders. 1
Second, the Court believed that "[m]entally retarded defendants in the
aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution." 0 7 It stated that there
is a high and grave risk of imposing the death penalty "in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty" on mentally retarded defendants
because of the possibilities of false confessions, inability to provide
meaningful assistance to their attorneys, and difficulty testifying on their
own behalf.' 0 8 Furthermore, it reasoned that there is a risk that juries may
interpret the demeanor of mentally retarded defendants as lacking remorse
for their offenses.10 9
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that executions of mentally retarded
defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment."' 1 0 The majority deemed such a punishment excessive for
mentally retarded offenders according to prevailing standards of decency
and believed neither the deterrent or retributive purpose was applicable to
the mentally retarded. 11' Atkins effectively overruled Penry, which had
first examined the issue of whether mentally retarded criminals should be
exempt from the death penalty and denied such an exception.12
2. Roper Bans Execution of Juveniles
a. Facts and Background
Just three years after the Supreme Court decided Atkins, and sixteen
years after Stanford,113 it undertook to answer whether juveniles under
eighteen years of age at the time of their capital offense should also be
categorically excluded from being sentenced to death based on the Eighth

106. Id. at 319-20.
107. Id. at 321.
108. Id. at 320-21. The Court also noted that relying on mental retardation as a
mitigating factor can be like a "two-edged sword" because a jury can see it instead as an
aggravating factor. Id. at 321.
109. Id. at 321.
110. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see generally Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21.
111. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21. Importantly, the Court did not decide that capital
punishment was disproportionate to the crime of murder, of which the defendant had been
convicted; rather, it determined that the punishment was excessive for this kind of defendant.
Id. at 320-21; see also Dieter, supra note 21, at 1120 (recognizing the distinction made in
Atkins between punishment that is disproportionate to the crime and punishment that is
excessive for a particular defendant); Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and Criminal
Culpability After Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. Dayton L. Rev. 355, 361 (2004) (noting that in
contrast to the analysis in Ford, Atkins was exempted from the death penalty because he
belonged to a class of people diagnosed with mental retardation rather than because of his
particular mental handicap).
112. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 335.

113. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text.
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Amendment prohibition 1 4 in Roper. The Roper ruling abrogated the
Court's earlier holding in Stanford.115 The Court determined in this most
recent case that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the
execution of juveniles, specifically those under the age of eighteen at the
6
time they committed their capital crimes. 1
In Roper, the defendant, Christopher Simmons, was seventeen years old
when he planned and committed capital murder. 17 Prior to committing the
crime, Simmons discussed his plan with two younger friends, fifteen-yearold Charles Benjamin and sixteen-year-old John Tessmer.118 Assuring his
proposed accomplices that they could "'get away with it"' because they
were juveniles, Simmons described his plan of breaking and entering into
the victim's home, tying her up, committing burglary, and murdering
her. 119 Tessmer decided against participating in the crime on the night of
the murder, but Simmons and Benjamin followed through with the plan and
broke into Shirley Crook's home. 12 0 After binding her hands and covering
her eyes and mouth, they drove her to a railroad trestle along a river. 12 1
There, they bound her hands and feet together, covered her face with duct
tape, and threw her off a bridge to her death. 122 Simmons then bragged to
friends that he had killed a woman "'because the bitch seen my face.""' 23
Fishermen found Crook's body in the river, and police arrested Simmons
the next day. 124 After being read his Miranda rights, he waived his right to
an attorney, confessed to the murder, and agreed to reenact the crime. 125
The prosecutor charged Simmons with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and
first-degree murder and tried him as an adult. 126 The jury convicted him of
murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to death upon the jury's
recommendation. 127
After several unsuccessful attempts for postconviction relief, Simmons received a rehearing from the Missouri Supreme

114. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (explaining the Eighth Amendment
and its applicability).
115. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (declaring that "Stanford v.
Kentucky should be deemed no longer controlling" and criticizing its earlier decision's

failure to consider the number of states that had banned the death penalty as part of the
consensus against the juvenile death penalty).

116. Id. at 578.
117. Id. at 555-57.
118. Id. at 556.
119. Id.

120. Id. Shirley Crook was not the originally intended victim, but Christopher Simmons
later confessed that when he recognized her from a previous car accident in which they had
both been involved, he became more determined to murder her. Id.
121. Id. at 556-57.
122. Id. at 557.
123. Id. (quoting Simmons).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Simmons was seventeen at the time of his crime, and Missouri's laws permitted
seventeen year olds to be tried as adults. Id. (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 211.021 (2000),
211.031 (Supp. 2003)).
127. Id. at 557-58.
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Court. 12 8

The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Simmons's argument
that the Court's reasoning in Atkins established a constitutional ban on
imposing the death penalty on juveniles who were under eighteen at the
time of their crimes. 129 In so deciding, the Missouri Supreme Court
abandoned the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Stanford.130 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 131
b. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The standard that the Supreme Court used to determine the
constitutionality of applying the death penalty to juveniles under eighteen
years of age at the time of their offense was "'evolving standards of
' ' ' 32 As in Atkins, 133
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. "
the Court also briefly discussed its historical jurisprudence concerning the
Eighth Amendment, stressing the individual's right to be free from
excessive sanctions, 134 the government's duty to respect the "dignity of all
persons,"' 35 and the notion that punishments should be commensurate with
the offense. 136 The Court relied on the plurality opinion in Thompson 37 to
provide the relevant factors that must be considered in an examination of
38
current standards of decency.1
The Court reviewed its decisions in Stanford139 and Penry, in which it
had ruled, respectively, that the Constitution did not prohibit executing
juveniles under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime, 140 and that it
also did not require a categorical exemption from the death penalty for
128. Id. at 558-60.
129. Id. at 559-60. Setting aside the death penalty, the Missouri Supreme Court
resentenced Simmons to "'life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or
release except by act of the Governor."' Id. at 560 (quoting State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper,
112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
130. See supra notes 55, 57-58 and accompanying text. The Missouri Supreme Court
relied on its observations that a national consensus had developed since Stanford against the
execution of juveniles. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60 (citing Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399).
131. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
132. Id. at 560-61 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
133. 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
134. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (discussing the Court's explanation of the Eighth
Amendment in Atkins).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
137. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing Thompson).
138. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 561-62. Some of the relevant factors in Thompson
included state legislation, jury verdicts, the number of executions, views of professional
organizations, international and foreign views and practices, moral reprehensibility, the
relative culpability of particular offenders, and retribution and deterrence. 487 U.S. at 81838.
139. The Court in Stanford relied on contemporary standards of decency in the United
States at the time of its decision to hold that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not
forbid executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders. Roper, 543 U.S. at 562 (citing
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989)).
140. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 562 (discussing Stanford); see also supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text (discussing Stanford).
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mentally retarded offenders. 14 1 The Court noted that standards of decency
had evolved so significantly since Penry that it had found it necessary in
Atkins to reverse its earlier decision.' 4 2 "Just as the Atkins Court
reconsidered the issue decided in Penry," the Roper Court would "now
143
reconsider the issue decided in Stanford."'
The Court in Roper followed the analysis used in Atkins and first looked
at legislative statistics, state practices, and trends, noting that the "evidence
of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and
in some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to
demonstrate a national consensus against the death penalty for the mentally
retarded."' 144 Noting similarities in Atkins, the Court pointed out that thirty
states prohibited the juvenile death penalty, 145 and that the practice is
14 6
infrequent even in the twenty states where it is not formally prohibited.
Furthermore, in 2003 the governor of Kentucky decided to grant clemency
to Kevin Stanford, "the very defendant whose death sentence the Court had
upheld in Stanford v. Kentucky," modifying his sentence to life
imprisonment without parole and declaring that the state ought not execute
147
legal minors.
The Court also considered how specific standards had evolved since its
ruling in Stanford as well as the more general direction of change. 148 In the
fifteen years since Stanford, five states had prohibited the juvenile death
penalty through legislative enactments and judicial decisions.' 49 Although
the change from Penry to Atkins was more dramatic in terms of the number
of states (sixteen) that had altered their legislation to ban executions of the
mentally retarded during the period between the two decisions, the Court
"still consider[ed] the change from Stanford to this case to be
significant."' 150 The Court believed that the changes that had occurred since
Stanford reflected a "'consistency of the direction of change' as in
Atkins,1 5 1 and that any differences in the abolition rates between Atkins and
141. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 562-63 (discussing Penry); see also supra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text (discussing Penry).
142. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64 (reviewing the Court's reasoning in Atkins).
143. Id. at 564.
144. Id.; see also id. at 564-67 (analyzing whether there is a national consensus regarding
the acceptability of imposing the death penalty on juveniles).
145. Id. at 564. The thirty states are comprised of eighteen death penalty states that
"exclude juveniles from its reach" by "express provision or judicial interpretation," and
twelve states that have abandoned the death penalty entirely. Id.; see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text (discussing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002)).
146. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65. Only three states had executed juveniles in the ten years
before Roper, and only six states had done so since Stanford. Id.; see also supra note 83 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's reliance in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16, on factors
such as the rarity of executions in death penalty states to confirm that a national consensus
had developed).
147. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
148. Id. at 565-66.
149. Id. at 565.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 565-66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315). Moreover, the Court found it
significant that in light of recent crackdowns on juvenile crime and the popularity of
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Roper were "counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change."' 152
It concluded that the criteria discussed above "provide[d] sufficient
evidence that today our society views
juveniles. . . as 'categorically less
'153
culpable than the average criminal.""
The Court then provided several reasons for why the diminished
culpability of juveniles required that they be categorically exempt from the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. 154 It stated that the Eighth
Amendment applied to the death penalty with "special force" because it
was the most severe of punishments.155 Therefore, the Court reasoned that
its imposition must be limited to the narrow category of those offenders
who commit the most serious crimes and whose "extreme culpability"
render them "'the most deserving of execution.""' 156 Due to the severity of
the punishment, a capital defendant may raise virtually any mitigating
factors about his character or the circumstances of the crime to lessen the
sentence. 157 The Court reasoned that juveniles under eighteen could not
reliably be considered among the "worst offenders" despite the seriousness
of their crimes because, as compared to adults (a) juveniles are generally
158
less mature, less responsible, and often make poor or reckless decisions;
(b) juveniles are "more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure";159 and (c) juveniles' characters
are not as developed, with more transient personality traits. 160 Based on
these factors, the Court determined that the irresponsible behavior of
juveniles could not be considered as "'morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.'"161
anticrime legislation, no states had acted to reinstate the juvenile death penalty since
Stanford. Id. at 566.
152. Id. at 566; see id.at 566-67 (explaining that the slower rate of change in juvenile
death penalty legislation may be because at the time of Stanford, twelve death penalty states
had already banned the execution of offenders under age eighteen, and fifteen states had
banned the practice for those under seventeen, in contrast to just two states that had
forbidden executing the mentally retarded when the Court decided Penry). "If anything,"
the Court stated, "this shows that the impropriety of executing juveniles between 16 and 18
years of age gained wide recognition earlier than the impropriety of executing the mentally
retarded." Id. at 566-67.
153. Id. at 567 (quoting the language of Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, regarding the mentally
retarded).
154. Id. at 568-71.
155. Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
156. Id. (quotingAtkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
157. Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
158. Id. at 569 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (stating that most
states recognize the immaturity and irresponsible nature of juveniles, and do not allow them
to vote, serve on juries, or marry without parental consent)).
159. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
160. Id. at 570 (citing Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968)).
161. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
In addition, it is more understandable that a minor might be unable to flee from negative
influences, and there is also a greater possibility for a minor to be reformed. Id. Thus, from
a moral standpoint, the Court thought it was unfair to treat and punish juveniles and adults
equally. Id. at 570-71.
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With regard to penological justifications, the Court felt that "neither
retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the
death penalty on juvenile offenders."' 162 Given the lesser culpability of
juvenile offenders, 163 the Court thought imposing the most severe penalty
164
on them would make retribution substantially disproportionate.
Moreover, it was questionable whether the possibility of execution would
have a significant deterrent effect on minors because "the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well
that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence."' 165 The Court believed
that the punishment of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for
66
minors was severe enough. 1
The Court acknowledged, without conceding its argument, that there may
be rare cases in which psychologically mature juvenile offenders commit
heinous and depraved crimes meriting death. 167 However, the Court found
it more convincing that the "differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
' 16 8
person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.'
Furthermore, the Court recognized that some would object to the creation of
a categorical rule because people do not suddenly undergo a significant
change upon turning eighteen.169 The Court explained, however, that a line
had to be drawn, and it relied on "where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood" to determine that eighteen was
70
a proper age for death penalty eligibility.'
Finally, the Court devoted the last portion of its majority opinion to the
views of the international community, foreign countries, and groups such as
17 1
the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales,
declaring that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling
[the] outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation"' 172 for
the Court's conclusion to disallow the juvenile death penalty. While stating
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 572.
See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
Id. The Court also quoted Thompson, stating that it is highly unlikely that teenage

offenders will have made "'the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of execution."' Id. at 572 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837).
166. Id. at 572; see also id. at 573-74 (stating that the state can take away some of a
juvenile offender's basic liberties but that it "cannot extinguish his life and his potential to
attain a mature understanding of his own humanity").
167. Id. at 572-73.
168. Id. The Court noted that in some cases, including this one when it was before the
lower court, it is possible for a juvenile offender's age to be counted as an aggravating rather
than mitigating factor. Id. at 573. The Court found this unacceptable. Id.
169. Id. at 574.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 575-79. Notably, the Court in Roper discussed the views of the world
community at length in the actual text of the opinion, whereas in Atkins the Court included
its discussion about international and foreign opinions and practices, views of professional
and religious organizations, and polling data in a mere footnote. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21

(2002).
172. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
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that the ultimate responsibility of interpreting the Eighth Amendment lies
with the Court and that world reality is not controlling, the Court
nevertheless launched into a lengthy discourse about international opinions
and practices. 173 In addition to the United States' position as the only
country to officially sanction the juvenile death penalty, 174 it had also not
signed the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
expressly prohibits the practice.' 7 5 Other multinational agreements contain
a prohibition against imposing the death penalty on juveniles under the age
of eighteen, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, 176 the American Convention on Human Rights, 177 and the African

Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.178 Additionally, in 1990,
the United States was only one of eight countries that executed juvenile
criminals, and since then all seven other countries have abolished the
practice or publicly renounced it. 179 The Court concluded its discussion by
stating, "It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of
80
those same rights within our own heritage of freedom." 1
As a result of all of the considerations discussed above, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders who were under eighteen
at the time of their crimes. 181

173. Id. at 575-79. The Court justified its examination of international and foreign views
by citing previous decisions in which the Court found international authorities and laws of
other nations to be instructive for interpreting the Eighth Amendment, including, among
others, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
317 n.21; and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
174. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
175. Id. at 576 (citing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, opened for
signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3). Every country in the world has ratified the
convention without reservations about this particular provision, except for the United States
and Somalia, which are not parties to the agreement. Id. at 576.
176. Id. (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(5), opened
for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368). The United States has signed
and ratified the convention subject to a reservation about this provision. Id. at 567.
177. Id. (citing the Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force
on July 8, 1978)).
178. Id. (citing the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 5(3),
adopted July 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force on Nov. 29,
1999)).
179. See id. at 577. The other seven countries are China, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
Furthermore, the Court
considered it instructive that the United Kingdom, where the principles behind the Eighth
Amendment originated, had abolished the juvenile death penalty long before the covenants
discussed above were created. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-78; see also supra notes 175-78.
180. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (addressing possible concerns about Constitutional fidelity
and interpretation).
181. Id.
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C. DefiningMental Illness in Relation to the Death Penalty
1. Definition of Mental Illness
Mental illness is defined as "[a]ny of various conditions characterized by
impairment of an individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or behavioral
functioning, and caused by social, psychological, biochemical, genetic, or
other factors, such as infection or head trauma."' 182 Common mental
illnesses experienced by death row inmates range from depression and
recurrent thoughts of death or suicide to bipolar disorder, post-traumatic
83
stress disorder, schizophrenia, and borderline personality disorder.
People suffering from mental illnesses cannot overcome them through
willpower, and their mental illnesses are unrelated to their intelligence or
character. 184 However, current treatments for serious mental illnesses are
very effective, with between seventy and ninety percent of people having
significantly reduced symptoms and better quality of life when treated with
8 5
a combination of pharmacological medicine and psychosocial support.'
For the purposes of this Note, and with respect to the death penalty
specifically, only severe mental illness will be discussed. Mental illnesses
fall along a "continuum of severity," with the most serious conditions
affecting five to ten million adults (roughly 2.6-5.4%) in the United
States. 186 The term "severe mental illness" does not encompass all mental
illnesses, but is narrowly defined by the American Psychiatric Association
as disorders with psychotic features that are accompanied by some
functional impairment and for which medication or hospitalization is often
required. 187 For example, schizophrenia and bipolar illness fall under the
umbrella of "severe mental illness,"18 8 while mental illnesses such as
189
depression or anxiety do not.
182. Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 18.
183. Id.
184. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 17 (citing National Alliance on Mental Illness,
About
Mental
Illness,

www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform-Yourself/About-Mental-Illness/About-M
entalIllness.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2007)).

185. See id. (citing National Alliance on Mental Illness, supra note 184). Although
effective treatments exist, because many mentally ill individuals remain untreated, the
repercussions for both the individuals and society are alarming. The economic cost to the
United States of untreated mental illness exceeds $100 billion annually and results in
"unnecessary disability, unemployment, substance abuse, homelessness, inappropriate
incarceration, suicide and wasted lives." Id.
186. National Alliance on Mental Illness, supra note 184; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra
note 18, at 17-18 (stating that the term mental illness can incorporate numerous conditions,
some of which are more serious than others).
187. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, A Definition of Severe Mental Illness,
http://www.psych.org/aids/modules/illness/sld005.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2007).

188. See id.; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 18-20 (listing several mental
illnesses that are frequently mentioned when questioning whether the United States ought to
allow executions of mentally ill offenders).
189. See generally Office of the Surgeon General, Mental Health: A Report of the
Surgeon
General
(1999),
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html.
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489

Borrowing
from the American
Bar
Association's
(ABA)
Recommendation 122A, a person is considered to have a severe mental
disorder or disability when he or she has an illness that is roughly
equivalent to disorders that mental health experts would deem the most
serious "Axis I diagnoses."' 90 Conditions such as schizophrenia and other
psychotic illnesses, major depressive disorders, mania, and dissociative
disorders fall under the "Axis I diagnoses" umbrella. 19 1 These mental
illnesses are all generally associated in their acute state with hallucinations,
delusions, disorganized thoughts, or significant disturbances in
consciousness, perception of the environment, and memory. 19 2
2. Distinguishing Mental Illness from Mental Retardation and Insanity
The Eighth Amendment protection extended categorically to mentally
retarded criminals in Atkins or insane offenders does not provide severely
mentally ill defendants, who are not also mentally retarded, with similar
safeguards against the death penalty. As such, it is necessary for those also
seeking a categorical exemption for the mentally ill to understand how
mental retardation and insanity differ from mental illness.
Mental retardation is defined as "'[s]ubnormal intellectual development
as a result of congenital causes, brain injury, or disease"' and is
"'characterized by any of various cognitive deficiencies, including impaired
learning, social, and vocational ability.""' 193 Mental illnesses and mental
retardation share certain similarities. For example, with regard to etiology,
mental retardation has biological components, as do mental illnesses. 194
However, one way in which the two differ is in the time of initial onset.
Specifically, mental retardation can arise at birth, infancy, or in early
childhood, and must be present by the time one turns eighteen years old. 195
On the other hand, with mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, one may
first experience a psychotic episode at some point in his or her twenties. 196
Stated more generally, mental retardation is a permanent developmental
disability, while mental illness is not necessarily present consistently or all
the time, whether because of remission or treatment. 197

190. ABA Recommendation 122A, supra note 15, at 6-7.
191. See id. at 7.
192. See id.
193. Death
Penalty
Info. Ctr.,
Mental
Illness
and
the
Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=782&scid=66 (last visited Aug. 27, 2007)
(quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1098 (4th ed. 2000));
see also Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 39-46 (stating that a person is diagnosed
with mental retardation if he or she is of sub-average intelligence and is limited in adaptive
functioning before the age of eighteen).
194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (stating that mental illness can be caused
by biochemical factors).
195. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 44.
196. Id. at 282.
197. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 18.
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Another difference is that mentally retarded people, by definition, must
be of subaverage intelligence,' 98 but there is no intelligence calculation that
factors into determining whether someone suffers from mental illnesses.1 99
Therefore, while there are some overlapping characteristics between mental
illness and mental retardation, they are still considered two distinct and
separate classifications by the law and the mental health and medical
200
professions.
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court formally constitutionalized
the ban on executing death row prisoners who were found to be insane or,
in broader terms, not competent for execution. 20 1 Justice Lewis F. Powell
offered his definition of insanity in his concurring opinion, stating that
Eighth Amendment protection against the death penalty should extend only
to those offenders whose mental illness renders them unable to understand
the nature of the death penalty and why they are subject to it.2 0 2 Notably,
the Ford Court's ruling was limited to capital defendants who had already
been convicted and sentenced to death, after having been found competent
at the time of the offense, at trial, and at sentencing. 20 3 The Court
essentially recognized that a capital offender's mental condition could be
dynamic over time. 20 4 Simply stated, a prisoner could become insane when
he had not been before. Insanity, as defined and understood in Ford, for
purposes of determining competence for execution, deals specifically with a
defendant's mental state at the time of execution rather than at the time of
the offense. 20 5 This Note focuses on a person's mental illness at the time of
the offense and, as such, a lengthier discussion of the Court's definition of

198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 273-74. However, a person with a
mental illness such as schizophrenia may experience cognitive disturbances, for example,
difficulty focusing. Id. at 274-78.
200. See generally Izutsu, supra note 13, at 1015-20 (discussing the similarities and
differences between mental illness and mental retardation).
201. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Amnesty Int'l,
supra note 18, at 120-24 (discussing the meaning of insanity as understood in Ford and
explaining that the Court's decision to leave the determination to the states of what
procedures to use to evaluate a prisoner's competence for execution has led to inconsistent
approaches).
202. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note
18, at 120-21 (discussing the standard set forth by the Ford Court, arguably as the minimal
standard to determine whether a death row inmate is competent for execution).
203. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 401-04 (stating that the capital defendant challenging his
competency for execution had not suggested that he had been incompetent at the time of his
crime, at trial, or at sentencing in 1974, but that behavioral and mental changes that occurred
after sentencing in 1982 rendered him incompetent for execution because he was unable to
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him).
204. See Hall, supra note 111, at 358-59. Hall further states that a mental disorder that
renders a person unable to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it is about to
be imposed on him may be treatable, and thus Ford has generated a wealth of literature
addressing the ethical and legal concerns of medicating prisoners on death row to restore
their competence to be executed. Id. at 359.
205. See Ford,477 U.S. at 401-04; Slobogin, supra note 13, at 298 n.41.
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"insanity" in Ford is beyond its scope. 206 The inquiries in Roper and Atkins
207
reflect this narrower focus.
Insanity is also used as a defense to absolve defendants from criminal
responsibility. 20 8 For example, pointing to his mental state at the time of
the crime, a defendant may enter a plea such as "not guilty by reason of
insanity" at the beginning of a capital trial. 20 9 The legal definition of
10
insanity in modem times comes from the 1843 English M'Naghten Case.2
The M'Naghten Rule states that
'[t]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 2or,
if he did
11
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.'
The exact legal standard for insanity in the United States varies from state
to state and has been frequently revised, but the insanity defense always
focuses on the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. 2 12 The
206. Determining "insanity" or competence to be executed according to the Ford
standard has also been the subject of criticism and concern by death penalty opponents
because the Court only provided the minimum components required to determine
competency for execution and did not mandate procedures that courts should follow to
determine a death row inmate's sanity. See supra notes 52, 201 and accompanying text; see
also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 120-32 (discussing Ford and arguing that it has been
ineffective in bringing about adequate reform in the judicial system in the twenty years
following it). However, because the analysis in this Note is based on Roper and Atkins,
which examined circumstances at the time of the offense, this Note refrains from delving
deeper into the issues surrounding a criminal's mental state at the time of execution.
207. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court specifically ruled that the death penalty should not
be imposed on offenders who were juveniles "when their crimes were committed." 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005). Furthermore, both Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-75, and Atkins, 536 U.S. 304,
317-21 (2002), discussed retribution and deterrence in the context of what the offender's
mental state would have been at the time of the crime and whether the diminished culpability
of both mentally retarded and juvenile defendants merits a sanction as extreme as the death
penalty. See also Slobogin, supra note 13, at 298 n.41 (stating that the relevant time frame
for analyzing mental state under Atkins is the time of the offense, unlike Ford, which
inquired about a defendant's mental state at the time of execution).
208. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15-16; see generally Hall, supra note 11, at
355-57 (explaining that "[i]nsanity is an exculpatory defense to a criminal charge" and
discussing its history and legal standard); James F. Hooper, The Insanity Defense: History
and Problems, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 409 (2006) (discussing the insanity defense in
criminal law).
209. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15.
210. See id. at 15 & n.38. The case involved a man named Daniel M'Naghten who shot
the secretary to the prime minister while suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. The jury
rendered a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and in response to public concern, the
House of Lords crafted what are known as the M'Naghten Rules to establish a basis for
when a person can be acquitted due to insanity. Id.
211. Hall, supra note 111, at 356 (quoting M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (H.L.)); see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15 n.38 (also citing the M'Naghten
Rule).
212. See Hall, supra note 11, at 356-57; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15 (noting
further that in the United States, the insanity defense was broadened in some jurisdictions to
absolve defendants from criminal responsibility if they were unable to control their actions
to the requirement of the law).
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insanity defense "recognize[s] that in certain circumstances, it does not
further the interests of justice to punish those who, although committing a
wrongful act, did not do so with culpable intent. '2 13 Therefore, if a
an
defendant can successfully prove insanity at the time of the offense,
2 14
insanity plea results in acquittal of the criminal charges against him.
However, the existence of an insanity defense does not, as many people
believe, provide a way for capital criminals to escape justice. 2 15 First,
several states have tightened their insanity laws or have abolished the
insanity defense altogether. 2 16 Furthermore, even a ruling of insanity by the
trial court still has serious consequences. For example, if a defendant is
found not guilty by reason of insanity, he is not released from detention but
is committed involuntarily to a psychiatric facility. 217 Moreover, the
insanity defense is rarely successful, with less than half of one percent of
trials actually resulting in exculpation due to insanity. 2 18 Evidently, the
insanity defense is often an inadequate safeguard for mentally ill
defendants. 2 19 Therefore proponents of the notion of excluding mentally ill
offenders from the death penalty contend that a categorical exemption is
both necessary to fill in the holes left by the
insanity defense and plausible
220
decisions.
Atkins
and
Roper
the
of
light
in
213. Hall, supra note 111, at 356-57.
214. See id. at 356 (pointing out that an insanity plea is by definition a plea of not guilty).
215. See Hooper, supra note 208, at 412. Many people object to the insanity defense
because they think it allows violent criminals to go unpunished. Id. Additionally, graduate
students polled by James Hooper often incorrectly estimated the number of criminal trials
that result in successful showings of insanity. Id.
216. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15; Hooper, supra note 208, at 413; see also
Blume & Johnson, supra note 13, at 138-39 (stating that four states-Kansas, Idaho,
Montana, and Utah-have abolished the insanity defense entirely).
217. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15.
218. See Hooper, supra note 208, at 412 (providing the statistic); see also Amnesty Int'l,
supra note 18, at 15 (noting that the defense is successful in only a small minority of cases).
219. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15-17. The report further notes that even
evidence of a defendant's mental health that is introduced as mitigating evidence or as a
relevant factor in determining the defendant's mental competence at various stages in the
capital proceeding frequently fails to protect mentally ill defendants. Id. at 16-17. In
addition, even states that alternatively allow verdicts of "guilty but mentally ill," have been
widely criticized. Id. at 16. Defendants found guilty but mentally ill are supposed to receive
mental health care during their prison sentences, but the reality is that prisoners are often not
even receiving minimal psychiatric care, much less optimal treatment. Id. at 16; see Hooper,
supra note 208, at 413-14. As such, the guilty but mentally ill verdict appears to be
ineffective as a means of prevention and treatment for mentally ill criminals. See Amnesty
Int'l, supra note 18, at 16; see also Blume & Johnson, supra note 13, at 138-39 (stating that
the problem with the insanity defense is that it provides extremely narrow protection).
220. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 15-41 (discussing how the insanity
defense and other supposed safeguards have been unsuccessful in protecting many mentally
ill offenders and what a categorical exemption for the mentally ill from the death penalty can
achieve); Blume & Johnson, supra note 13, at 121-22 (stating that professional mentalhealth organizations unanimously agree that the capital punishment system in its current
state does not sufficiently address the complexity of cases concerning mentally ill
offenders); Hooper, supra note 208, at 416 (stating that because of "the capricious manner in
which the death penalty is meted out, the United States would do well to listen to the experts
on human behavior and change our laws").
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II. APPLICATION OF ROPER AND A TKINS TO SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS

In Roper and Atkins, the Supreme Court relied on several factors to
conclude that juveniles and mentally retarded persons ought to be
categorically exempt from the death penalty. The Court placed the most
weight on evidence of a national consensus against executing juveniles and
the mentally retarded, stating that standards of decency had evolved
significantly since earlier cases when it had denied death penalty exclusion
for such classes of offenders. 22 1 In determining whether a consensus
existed against allowing the death penalty for these categories of persons,
the Court looked to such things as state legislation, sentencing practices by
courts and juries, and popular polls. 222

In addition, it also looked at

international and foreign laws and practices, 223 as well as the professional
stances of organizations with germane expertise, 2 24 though it noted that
such evidence was merely instructive and supportive rather than
determinative of the Court's ultimate decision.2 25 The Court also
performed a proportionality analysis in each case to determine whether the
deterrent and retributive goals of the death penalty were being met
by
227
allowing mentally retarded 226 and juvenile defendants to be executed.
Part II of this Note applies the analysis the Supreme Court used in Roper
and Atkins to severely mentally ill offenders and examines whether they
should be categorically exempt from the death penalty.

221. See generally supra Part I.B.1.b (explaining the Court's reasoning in Atkins for
holding that mentally retarded offenders cannot be executed), Part I.B.2.b (discussing the
Supreme Court's reasoning for determining that juveniles deserved categorical exemption
from the death penalty in Roper).
222. See supra Part I.B. L.b (discussing Atkins), Part I.B.2.b (discussing Roper).
223. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (discussing the current views
held by the international community and foreign countries concerning the juvenile death
penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (discussing the opinions of
professional organizations, religious communities, and the world community, as well as
polling data among Americans who overwhelmingly disapprove of executing the mentally
retarded).
224. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (stating that the professional organizations with
relevant expertise opposed capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders).
225. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that the views and practices of the international
community do "not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains [the Supreme Court's] responsibility"); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (stating that a
consensus among relevant professional organizations, views of religious groups, and
disapproval from the world community about executing mentally retarded persons were
factors that were "by no means dispositive" although "their consistency with the legislative
evidence lends further support to [the Court's] conclusion that there is a consensus").
226. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; see also supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text
(discussing the proportionality analysis).
227. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-73; see also supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text
(describing the deterrence and retribution analyses).
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A. Consensus
1. National Consensus
a. State Legislation
Connecticut is the only state that has legislatively proscribed imposing
the death penalty on mentally ill defendants who, despite their mental
illnesses, were competent to be executed.22 8 Connecticut's law states that
courts cannot impose a death sentence on a defendant if the jury or court
concludes "that at the time of the offense . . . the defendant's mental

capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to conform
the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to
prosecution." 229 This single state statute shielding the mentally ill from the
death penalty stands in stark contrast to the legislative landscape of the
states when Roper and Atkins were decided. At the time of Roper and
Atkins, there was much greater statutory opposition to the practice of
offenders than there currently is
executing juveniles and mentally 23retarded
0
against executing the mentally ill.
There is little evidence that other states are considering following
Connecticut's lead in imposing such a categorical ban. 2 31 However, most
states have capital statutes that implicate mental illness as a mitigating
factor. 232 Furthermore, twenty-eight of the thirty-eight states that sanction
the death penalty allow mental illness to have a mitigating impact by
permitting the jury to consider the defendant's capacity "'to appreciate the
criminality [or wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law. '"'233 Several statutes even stipulate that
impairments in capacity may be due to mental illness, mental disease, or
228. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h) (2006); see also Slobogin, supra note 13, at 297-98
(discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on legislation to help determine whether standards
of decency are evolving, and pointing out that in contrast to the legislative sentiment
regarding executing people with mental retardation, Connecticut is the only state that has
banned the death penalty for mentally ill defendants).
229. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(h) (2006).
230. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (stating that thirty states, including the twelve states that
rejected the death penalty entirely, also prohibit the juvenile death penalty); Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 313-15. The Court in Atkins noted that a national consensus concerning the execution of
mentally retarded offenders existed because, in addition to the states that no longer had the
death penalty, close to twenty states had enacted legislation exempting the mentally retarded
from the death penalty while maintaining it as a legitimate form of punishment. 536 U.S. at
313-15. Moreover, states had been moving consistently in the direction of such a
prohibition. Id.
231. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 13, at 298 (noting the dearth of state legislation and
proposals for legislation about exempting defendants with mental illness from receiving
death sentences).
232. See Izutsu, supra note 13, at 1004-06 (discussing state death penalty statutes and
severe mental illness as a mitigating factor).
233. Id. at 1005 & nn.68 & 69 (alteration in original) (quoting statutes of several states,
including Arkansas, California, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Virginia).
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mental defect. 2 34 This pattern of inclusion of mental illness provisions in
death penalty laws suggests that many states recognize that mental illness
mental illness, if
can affect a person's culpability and that an offender's
235
present, ought to be considered during sentencing.
Since Atkins and Roper, the number of states that legislatively prohibit
the death penalty has not changed-twelve states do not permit executions
and thirty-eight states do. 236 Of the thirty-eight death penalty states,
however, four have not executed anyone since 1976.237

Moreover, New

York's death penalty statute was overturned in 2004, and although one man
still remains
on New York's death row, capital punishment has not been
23 8
reinstated.
In 2006, New Jersey became the first jurisdiction to enact a one-year
moratorium on executions through a 55-21 vote by the legislative
assembly.2 39 Acting Governor Richard Codey signed the bill into law on
January 12, 2006, and the moratorium is effective in New Jersey until
January 15, 2007.240 During the year, the state commissioned a task force
to study the costs and fairness of imposing the death penalty. 24 1 Prior to
New Jersey's moratorium and task force study, North Carolina and
California also conducted legislative examinations of their respective
242
capital punishment systems, but they did so without halting executions.
Although the moratorium is not specifically a response to concerns about
executing mentally ill defendants, presumably the task force's inquiry into
the fairness of imposing the death penalty will encompass an examination
of the fairness of imposing capital punishment on mentally ill criminals.
234. See id. at 1005 & n.70 (citing statutes from several different states that explicitly
refer to mental illnesses, diseases, or defects).
235. See id. at 1006. The author notes, however, that the statutory provisions do not
precisely explain what mental illness or impairment of capacity means. Id. Nevertheless, the
author believes that such criteria would certainly include people suffering from severe
mental illnesses. Id.
236. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty 1 (2007) [hereinafter
DPIC Facts], availableat http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf.
237. Id. Specifically, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York have not
carried out any executions since 1976, id., when the Supreme Court reinstated the death
penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 4445.
238. DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 1; Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in
2006: Year End Report 1 (2006) [hereinafter DPIC 2006 Year End Report], available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2006YearEnd.pdf.
239. See DPIC 2006 Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1; Gloria Rubac, Death Penalty
Moratorium in New Jersey, Worker's World, Jan. 26, 2006, at 3, available at
http://www.workers.org/2006/ww- 12606.pdf.
240. See Rubac, supra note 239.
241. Seeid.
242. See DPIC 2006 Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1; Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Costs of the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7
(last visited Aug. 31, 2007) (stating that North Carolina's death penalty study was the most
comprehensive in the country). The study revealed that North Carolina spends $2.16 million
more per execution than on a non-death penalty, life imprisonment case. Id. California's
study results showed that it spends $90 million more per year on capital cases than on
ordinary costs of the justice system. Id.
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Thus, this legislative moratorium may be a sign of reform and change in
death penalty laws concerning, among others, the mentally ill.
Professor J. Richard Broughton critiques the Supreme Court's decisions
in Atkins and Roper-which concluded that a national consensus had
developed-as being not based on a "meaningful numeric majority of
jurisdictions that imposed capital punishment but prohibited the practice of
executing the mentally retarded" or juveniles. 243 Rather, it was based on
"'the consistency of the direction of change"' 244 following Penry and
Stanford respectively. Stating that evidence of a national consensus was
too tenuous, Broughton criticizes the Court for formulating a new
understanding of what signifies a national consensus concerning a certain
death penalty practice, elaborating that "[n]ational consensus now may be
understood simply as a significant trend. .
245

.

. But a trend does not a

consensus make."
Proponents of a categorical ban on executing mentally ill criminals or
those that assert that a trend is developing against executing the mentally ill
may also be subject to the same criticism: A mere trend toward restricting
the scope of the death penalty for the mentally ill through statewide death
penalty studies and legislative acts without a numeric majority of states
adhering to the ban is insufficient to meet the national consensus criteria.
The Court's reliance on the state-counting model in Penry246 also supports
the notion that a national consensus with respect to the propriety of
imposing the death penalty on mentally ill criminals can only exist if there
is cold, hard data confirming that many state statutes outlaw the practice.
Furthermore, another legal expert in capital punishment writes that,
although many similar assertions can be made about people with severe
mental illness as were made in Atkins about mentally retarded persons, and
although the Court is willing to look at more subjective factors, "a
determination that evolving standards of decency have been abridged still
requires some evidence of statutory evolution, and that evidence simply
does not exist with respect to the execution of people with mental
24 7
illness."

243. Broughton, supra note 79, at 646 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315
(2002)).

244. Id. at 646-47 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005)); see also
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (setting forth the "consistency of the direction of change" analysis).
245. Broughton, supra note 79, at 647.
246. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (stating that evidence of two states
having prohibited capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders and fourteen states
having eliminated the death penalty entirely was insufficient to indicate a national
consensus).
247. Slobogin, supra note 13, at 297. But see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of
Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National

Consensus, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1089 (2006) (opining that state legislative trends should not be
the basis for interpreting the Eighth Amendment because that would be "contrary to basic
notions of federalism").
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b. Practice of the Courts in Sentencing, Clemencies, Judicial Opinions,
and Moratoriums

i. Sentencing Practices of Courts
The number of death penalty sentences issued by American courts per
year has dropped sharply since 1998, declining from 298 sentences in 1998
to 128 sentences in 2005.248 In 2006, the number of death sentences was
expected to fall to a thirty-year low. 249 Furthermore, the actual number of
capital sentences carried out in the United States has also decreased from 98
in 1999 to just 53 in 2006.250 In addition, 2006 had the lowest number of
executions nationwide since 1996 when only 45 death sentences were
carried out. 25 1 As of August 16, 2007, there have only been 33
executions. 252 Admittedly, the low number may be partially attributable to
recent lethal injection court cases, which impermanently froze some
executions. 253 If the controversy concerning lethal injection is resolved, the
number of executions may rise again. 254 The number of executions is
nevertheless down about forty percent since its highest point in 1999.255
The death row population has also decreased, with about 3366 awaiting
execution in 2006 as opposed to the 3625 who were on death row in
1999.256

Specifically with regard to mentally ill offenders, there are other reasons
to believe that standards are evolving in death penalty jurisprudence. The
imposition of the death penalty by juries on mentally ill offenders who lack
the ability to control their conduct or are volitionally impaired is so

248. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 3.
249. See DPIC 2006 Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1-2 (estimating approximately
114 death sentences based on six-month projections).
250. Id. at 1.
251. Id. at 2.
252. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 1.
253. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, controversies about lethal
injection have resulted in stays of executions in several states, including Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Dakota. DPIC 2006
Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1-2. Specifically, sixteen death row inmates were
granted stays in 2006 based partially or wholly on challenges to the lethal injection process.
See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Lethal Injections: Some Cases Stayed, Other Executions
Proceed, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1686&scid=64 (last visited Sept.
1, 2007) [hereinafter DPIC Lethal Injections]. Anesthesiology studies have shown that
lethal injections could be causing unnecessarily excruciating pain and that inmates who
received the injections may have been conscious throughout the process. See DPIC 2006
Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1-2. Many argue that this is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See DPIC Lethal Injections, supra.
Despite the existence of claims against lethal injection, many other states have continued
executing death row inmates. See id.
254. See DPIC 2006 Year End Report, supra note 238, at 2.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 1-2 (stating that there has been a continuous annual decrease in the
number of people on death row since 2000, after twenty-five years of steadily increasing
numbers).
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infrequent as to be practically unknown. 257 Furthermore, upon review by
governors and officials, some death row258inmates are being granted
clemencies because of their mental illnesses.
ii. Clemencies

Since 1976, more than 200 clemencies have been granted for people on
death row for humanitarian reasons. 2 59 Among them are several death row
inmates who were granted clemency because of their mental illnesses.
For example, in 1993 Missouri's then-Governor Mel Carnahan granted
clemency to Bobbie Shaw because it was evident that in addition to being
mentally retarded he also suffered from mental illness. 260 In Georgia in
2002, the state parole board commuted Alexander Williams's death
sentence to life without parole because he suffered from mental illness and
was a juvenile at the time of his offense. 26 1 Governor Mitch Daniels of
Indiana also commuted the death sentence of a severely mentally ill man,
Arthur P. Baird II, to life without parole in 2005 after many jurors from his
trial, upon learning post-sentencing about his mental illness, declared that
Baird deserved life imprisonment rather than death due to his mental
262
illness.
Even though courts continue to sentence mentally ill defendants to death,
often without proper testimony during the trial to even inform the judge or
jury about the defendant's illness, these examples suggest that those who
have the authority to sentence and grant clemencies to death row inmates
frown upon executing the mentally ill.
iii. Opinions of State Judges
Non-majority opinions, namely concurrences and dissenting opinions,
often carry great weight in shaping future decisions. 263 In State v. Ketterer,
257. See Blume & Johnson, supra note 13, at 117-18 (stating that there is only one
known case in South Carolina in which a mentally ill defendant was sentenced to death even
after it had been determined that his illness had made him unable to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law).
258. See
Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
Clemency,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=126&scid=13 (last visited Sept. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter DPIC Clemency] (providing information about clemencies that have been
granted for various reasons in different states); see also Richard C. Dieter, Introduction to
the Presentations: The Path to an Eighth Amendment Analysis of Mental Illness and Capital

Punishment, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1117, 1121 (2005) (using such information about
clemencies to draw the conclusion that the public's opinion of capital punishment standards
is changing).
259. See DPIC Clemency, supra note 258.
260. See id.
261. Id.

262. See id. The sentence of life imprisonment without parole had not been available at
the time of Arthur P. Baird 1I's sentencing but was made available later, allowing Governor
Mitch Daniels to commute Baird's death sentence. See id
263. For example, in Atkins, the Supreme Court stated explicitly that one of the reasons
for granting certiorari in the case was because of the "gravity of the concerns expressed by
the dissenters" in the lower court. 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
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decided in October 2006, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton's concurrence
called upon Ohio's state legislature to review its death penalty laws 264
to
exempt defendants with serious mental illnesses from the death penalty.
The defendant, Donald Ketterer, was sentenced to death for the murder of
his friend, and upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision. 26 5 In her concurrence, Justice Lundberg Stratton conceded that
Ketterer was guilty of committing a brutal murder, but took issue with the
fact that the law had been inadequate in accounting for his serious mental
illness. 266 Ketterer had a lifelong history of mental illnesses, the most
serious of which was bipolar disorder which made it difficult, if not
impossible, for him to control his impulses. 267 Moreover, his mental illness
included manic and depressive symptoms, as well as psychotic features
such as auditory hallucinations and paranoia. 268 Nevertheless, Ketterer
did
2 69
not meet the criteria for being deemed not guilty by reason of insanity.
Justice Lundberg Stratton believed that the undisputed testimony about
Ketterer's serious mental illness placed him in a different classification of
people from those without mental illnesses. 270 She stated, however, that
she had to "reluctantly concur in the affirmance of Ketterer's sentence of
death" because the current law of Ohio state so required. 27 1 She did not
contest Ketterer's guilt and acknowledged that the current laws supported
273
his death sentence. 272 However, she criticized the current laws,
declaring that "the time has come to reexamine whether we, as a society,
should administer the death penalty to a person with a serious mental
illness." 274 In assessing whether current laws permitting executions of the
mentally ill are constitutional, one factor she considered was the ABA's
task force and its recommendations about mental illness and the death
264. State v. Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d 48, 86-87 (Ohio 2006) (Lundberg Stratton, J.,

concurring).
265. Id. at 56, 58 (majority opinion).
266. Id. at 81-82 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 82-84 (stating that he had also come from a family with a long history of
mental illness and suicide attempts, had been treated and/or hospitalized in thirteen different
cities, had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse, and had also been severely physically
abused by his father as a child).
268. Id. at 82-83 (explaining that Donald Ketterer had begun hearing his father's voice a
year after he passed away, and that people with bipolar disorder often act inappropriately,
engaging in unethical or illegal activities because of their impaired judgment and lack of
impulse control).
269. Id. at 82.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 87.
272. Id. at 84.
273. See id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (stating that the
law "requires 'a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also
humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual')); see also id. (citing Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (providing that "evolving standards of decency" should
dictate whether executing a particular class of offenders was violative of the Eighth
Amendment)).
274. Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d at 82 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring); see also id. at 87
(reiterating that society must now reevaluate whether severely mentally ill persons ought to
be executed).
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penalty. 275
According to Justice Lundberg Stratton, the ABA's
recommendations and the fact that all or part of the recommendations were
adopted by organizations such as the National Alliance on Mental Illness,
the American Psychological Association, and the American Psychiatric
Association provided evidence that society opposes executing severely
276
mentally ill defendants.
In addition to looking at societal views about executing the mentally ill,
Justice Lundberg Stratton compared mental illness to mental retardation,
concluding that many of the arguments made and accepted by the Supreme
Court concerning mentally retarded offenders in Atkins can also be made
for mentally ill defendants because they share many of the same
characteristics. 2 77
Specifically, she opined that severely mentally ill
defendants, like mentally retarded defendants, "have diminished capacities
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 27 8
Furthermore, she stated that there is no proof that people in either group are
more likely than others to engage in criminal conduct, although there is a
great deal of evidence that they frequently act impulsively rather than
according to a premeditated plan. 279 As a result of such deficiencies, the
Atkins Court felt it proper to hold that mentally retarded criminals have
diminished personal culpability although they are not exempt from criminal
sanctions. 2 80 Justice Lundberg Stratton believed the same argument could
be made for mentally ill defendants, but acknowledged that mental illness is
not as easy to define and identify as mental retardation. 2 8 1 However, she
went on to say that modem medical and scientific knowledge may make it
2 82
easier to quantify mental illness as a defense.
Justice Lundberg Stratton concluded by stating that, although it was her
personal belief that mentally ill defendants ought to now be categorically
precluded from capital punishment, "the line should be drawn by the
General Assembly, not by a court. '283 In urging the general assembly of
Ohio to consider passing legislation about the mentally ill and the death
penalty, she wrote, "[N]othing prevents the legislature from examining and
using those same evolving standards [used in Atkins]. . . . The general
275. See id. at 85; see generally ABA Recommendation 122A, supra note 15; Ronald J.
Tabak, Overview of the Task Force Proposalon Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54
Cath. U. L. Rev. 1123 (2005) (discussing the ABA task force's work and proposals

regarding mental disability and the death penalty).
276. See Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d at 84-85 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 86-87.
278. Id. at 86 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318).
279. Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318).
280. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
281. Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d at 86-87 (stating, for example, that mental retardation has
objective symptoms and is permanent, whereas mental illness is a much broader category
with varying treatments, diagnoses, and periods of remission).
282. Id. at 87.
283. Id.
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assembly would be the proper body to examine these variations, take public
testimony, hear from experts in the field, and fashion criteria for the judicial
284
system to apply."
Other state judges have voiced their belief that the rationale in Atkins
should likewise apply to mentally ill defendants and protect them from the
death penalty. For example, in Corcoran v. State, Justice Robert D. Rucker
dissented because he did not believe the death penalty was appropriate for
severely mentally ill defendants. 285 Relying on Atkins, he stated that "the
underlying rationale for prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is
just as compelling for prohibiting executions of the seriously mentally ill,
namely evolving standards of decency." 286 Justice Rucker was persuaded
that life without the possibility of parole was a more appropriate
punishment because of the defendant's severe mental illness. 28 7 Justice
Rucker aligned himself with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme
Court, who stated even prior to the Atkins ruling, "'Mental illness is a
medical disease .... As a society, we have always treated those with mental
illness differently from those without. In the interest of human dignity, we
must continue to do so .... I believe that executing a convict with a severe
288
mental illness is a cruel and unusual punishment."'
However, such beliefs are far from uniform among judges. Some state
justices think Atkins has no relevance to mentally ill defendants. In State v.
Weik, for example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina wrote, "while it
violates the Eighth Amendment to impose a death sentence on a mentally
retarded defendant, the imposition of such a sentence upon a mentally ill
2 89
person is not disproportionate."
While it is disappointing to those who favor outlawing the death penalty
for the mentally ill, the fact that the opinions discussed above, which favor
categorically excluding mentally ill defendants from the death penalty, are
dissenting and concurring opinions further demonstrates that such a belief is
not utterly pervasive among judges.
iv. Moratoriums
Since 1973, over 120 death row inmates have been freed due to evidence
of their innocence, and between 2000 and 2004 thirty-five people were

284. Id. (stating also that it is the legislature's duty to consider and act upon evolving
standards of decency concerning the mentally ill and the death penalty).
285. Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 503.
288. Id. at 502-03 (quoting Ohio v. Scott, 748 N.E.2d 11, 20 (Ohio 2001) (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1034 (2001)).
289. State v. Weik, 587 S.E.2d 683, 687 (S.C. 2003) (citations omitted). The state's
experts had diagnosed the defendant in this case with schizotypal personality disorder, and
the defendant's experts had diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia. All of the experts
agreed that the defendant had paranoid beliefs involving the Central Intelligence Agency and

the Masons. Id. at 80 & n.2.
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released and exonerated. 290 In addition, in Illinois, former Governor
George Ryan issued a blanket commutation on the sentences of all death
row prisoners in the state just days before leaving office in January 2003 *291
He expressed concerns about the "demon of error" in the capital system and
commuted essentially all of the 167 death sentences in the state to life
imprisonment without parole. 292 Former Governor Ryan's commutation
order followed a moratorium he had placed on the death penalty in Illinois
in 2000.293 Illinois's moratorium is currently continuing well into its
seventh year.294 Similarly, Governor Jeb Bush also issued an executive
order declaring a moratorium on all executions in Florida in light of lethal
injection problems, pending a review of lethal injection methods. 295
Although these two state moratoriums on the death penalty do not
specifically deal with mentally ill defendants, they are signs of states'
willingness to review problems that are brought to their attention regarding
the death penalty.
c. Juries and PopularPolls

296

Polls and jury behavior can provide an objective indication of public
sentiment and contemporary values. Unfortunately, there is little data
available that directly addresses how many times or how often juries are
asked to consider the death penalty for mentally ill offenders, and how
often they do, in fact, sentence severely mentally ill offenders to death.
However, there is evidence of jurors speaking out against the death penalty
for mentally ill offenders after they have already been sentenced to death.
290. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 2.
291. See Jeff Flock, "Blanket Commutation" Empties Illinois Death Row: Incoming
Governor
Criticizes
Decision,
CNN.com,
Jan.
13,
2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/1 l/illinois.death.row/.
292. Id. Governor George Ryan's decision affected 156 death row inmates and eleven
others who had been sentenced to death but were not in the custody of the department of
corrections because they were awaiting trials in other cases or resentencing. See id. Four
death row prisoners were pardoned after it was found that they had been tortured into
confessing to crimes they did not commit; three death row prisoners had their sentences
reduced to forty years to make their sentences similar to those of their codefendants; and the
remaining death row inmates had their sentences commuted to life without parole. See id.;
see also DPIC Clemency, supra note 258 (discussing Illinois's broad commutation grant
regarding death sentences in 2003).
293. See Illinois Suspends Death Penalty: Governor Calls for Review of "Flawed"
System,
CNN.com,
Jan.
31,
2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/01/3 1/illinois.executions.02/.
294. DPIC 2006 Year End Report, supra note 238, at 1.
295. See DPIC Lethal Injections, supra note 253; Fla. Exec. Order No. 06-260 (Dec. 15,
2006), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FloridaExecutiveOrder.pdf.
296. In both Roper and Atkins, the Court relied on some factual information provided by
certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their amici curiae briefs but did not
consider the personal opinions of such NGOs as determinative of the outcome of each case.
Therefore, while the opinions and work of NGOs and the influence of the media are
important and relevant to issues about the death penalty because they play active roles in
informing the public and in pressuring legislative bodies and politicians to make reforms,
this Note refrains from pursuing a lengthy discussion about NGOs and the media.
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For example, in early 2004, the state parole board of Georgia commuted
Willie James Hall's death sentence to one of life imprisonment without
parole after six jurors testified that they would have chosen life without
parole had it been offered at the time of the trial. 29 7 Also, in offering
clemency to Arthur P. Baird 11,298 jurors from his trial expressed their belief
that Baird deserved life imprisonment without parole, which was not
available at the time of his sentencing, rather than the death penalty due to
his severe mental illness. 299 Furthermore, in 1999, Governor James
Gilmore of Virginia granted clemency to Calvin Swann, noting that prison
officials described Swann's behavior on death row as "nothing short of
bizarre and totally devoid of rationality. '30 0 Moreover, the prosecuting
attorney stated that he would not have pursued the death penalty if life
imprisonment without parole had been available at the time the case was
tried. 30 1 Most importantly, however, in granting clemency Governor
Gilmore stated that the jury had been misinformed about the extent of
Swann's mental illness. 302 By making such a statement and preventing
Swann's execution, Governor Gilmore implied that, had the jury been
properly informed about the severity of Swann's mental illness, it would
have chosen not to impose the death penalty.
A Gallup poll from May 2006 revealed that overall support for the death
3 03
penalty had dropped from 80% in 1994 to 65% at the present time.
Moreover, a greater percentage of respondents choose life without parole
over the death penalty when given the choice between the two sentencing
options. 30 4 A comparison among the May 2006 poll, May 2004 poll, and
May 2003 poll reveals that support for the death penalty has been dropping
incrementally both when considered alone and as an alternative. 30 5 Overall
support for the death penalty dropped 9% from 2003 to 2006,306 and
support for life imprisonment without possibility of parole as an alternative
297. See DPIC Clemency, supra note 258 (adding that, in making its decision, the board
also considered Willie James Hall's good behavior in prison and clean criminal record prior
to the murder).
298. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
299. DPIC Clemency, supra note 258.
300. Id.
301. Id.

302. Id.
303. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 4.

304. See id. Specifically, 48% of the respondents preferred life without parole, 47%
preferred the death penalty, and 5% had no opinion. Id. The Gallup poll was conducted
from May 5 to 7, 2006, on approximately 500 adults eighteen years of age and older
nationwide, with a margin of sampling error of plus or minus five. Polling Report, Crime /
Law Enforcement, http://pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
305. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 4; David W. Moore, Gallup Poll: Public
Divided Between Death Penalty and Life Imprisonment Without Parole, Gallup News
Service, June 2, 2004, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1029&scid=;

Polling Report, supra note 304.
306. See Moore, supra note 305 (listing the results of the 2004 and 2003 Gallup polls);
Polling Report, supra note 304 (stating that 74% supported the death penalty in May 2003
and that support fell to 65% in 2006).
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to the death penalty rose 4% from 2003 to 2006.307 Perhaps most telling,
though, is the fact that in a 2002 Gallup poll, 75% of those surveyed
opposed executing the mentally ill. 30 8 Thus, even though almost two-thirds
of Americans generally supported the death penalty, an even greater
percentage of Americans were against imposing it on mentally ill
309
offenders.
In the examples provided above, clemencies were granted to mentally ill
death row inmates due to assumptions or actual findings that juries would
not have sentenced them to death had there been an alternative. It appears
that if given an option, many juries may prefer sentencing a mentally ill
defendant to life imprisonment over capital punishment. Furthermore, the
numbers from the 2006 Gallup poll revealed that the public marginally
favored life without parole over its alternative-the death penalty. 3 10 Since
the poll respondents are all presumably potential jurors, the Gallup poll
further supports the notion that juries may disfavor the death penalty as
punishment for mentally ill criminals if life imprisonment is a possibility.
Nevertheless, despite such data and implications, the fact remains that juries
continue to impose the death penalty, although it is unknown how many of
the estimated 114 death sentences in 2006 were imposed on mentally ill
defendants. 3 11 Thus, there is no clear pattern among juries of either leaning
away from or toward executing the mentally ill. In addition, despite the
drop in support for the death penalty in the past several years, according to
a recent Gallup poll, more than half of the poll participants still supported
it.31 2 The statistics merely demonstrate an overall trend of waning public
support for the death penalty. 3 13 Nevertheless, specifically with regard to
public opinion about the propriety of executing mentally ill offenders, the
Gallup poll from 2002 in which three-fourths of those surveyed said that
they opposed it, provides compelling evidence that Americans are against
executions when they involve mentally ill persons. 3 14
307. See Polling Report, supra note 304 (providing statistics that show an increase in
support for life imprisonment rather than the death penalty from 44% in 2003 to 48% in
2006); see also DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 4 (providing Gallup poll results from May
2006); Moore, supra note 305 (listing May 2004 and May 2003 Gallup poll results).
308. See State v. Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d 48, 85 (Ohio 2006) (Lundberg Stratton, J.,
concurring) (providing Gallup poll data from 2002).
309. See id. (comparing Gallup poll data from 2002 and 2003).
310. See generally supra notes 304-05, 307 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. The statistics about death sentences in
the Death Penalty Information Center's 2006 Year End Report do not specify how many
death sentences were imposed on mentally ill offenders. See generally DPIC 2006 Year End
Report, supra note 238.
312. See supra notes 303, 305-06 and accompanying text. The 2006 poll did not
specifically ask participants whether they would still support the death penalty if it was
imposed on mentally ill defendants. Thus it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the
public's current support for executing mentally ill offenders.
313. It is uncertain from this statistic alone whether the general trend of decreasing
support for the death penalty also extends to the public's view of imposing the death penalty
on mentally ill defendants in particular.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
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2. International Consensus and Foreign Law

International communities oppose capital punishment as a general matter,
but also specifically for individuals with mental disorders. 3 15 After World

War II, the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed a "right to life."'3 16 During

the 1950s and 1960s, many international human rights treaties were drafted,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the
United States has ratified, and the European Convention on Human Rights,
which provided for the right to life and led to many Western European
nations stopping their use of the death penalty. 317 By the 1980s, there was
a de facto abolition of the death penalty in Western Europe. 3 18 Also, in the
1980s, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which seeks to
abolish the death penalty around the world.3 19 Furthermore, in 1990,
member nations of the Organization of American States signed the Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
320

Penalty.
The European Union and the Council of Europe have conditioned
countries' membership on the abolition of the death penalty, and as such,
even nations that once had harsh capital punishment systems, such as
Turkey, have promised to abandon the death penalty to gain admission to
the European Union. 32 1 In addition, with the exception of Turkey, every
European country has signed Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 322 which proscribes the death penalty in
peacetime. 323 Currently, more than half of the countries in the world have

315. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 1.
316. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); see also Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Part II: History of the Death
Penalty:
Limiting
the
Death
Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 15&did=41 I (last visited Sept. 2, 2007).
317. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 316.
318. Id.
319. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 2; Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989). The United States has not
signed this treaty. Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 2.
320. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. 73. The United States is a member of the Organization of
American States, but it has not signed or ratified this treaty. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
supra note 17, at 2-3.
321. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 3.
322. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983,
Europ. T.S. 114.
323. See id.; Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 3.
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legally or by practice abolished the death penalty. 324 Sixty-nine countries
still retain the death penalty, but in 2005 executions occurred in only
twenty-two countries, with ninety-four percent of known executions taking
place in just four countries: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United
325
States.
With regard to mentally ill offenders in particular, the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights passed a resolution in 1999 urging countries "not to
impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental
disorder." 326 In 2004, it passed another resolution concerning the death
penalty, using the same language to call on nations that still maintain the
death penalty to stop imposing it on individuals with any form of mental
disorder. 327 Certainly, severe mental illness would be considered a form of
mental disorder. In 1997, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions stated in a report that governments that
continue to use capital punishment on "the mentally ill are particularly
called upon to bring their domestic legislation into conformity with
international legal standards. ' 328 In addition, the European Union, whose
brief the Supreme Court cited in Atkins, 329 has also expressed disapproval
of the practice of executing persons with severe mental illness through
letters urging states to commute death sentences of mentally ill death row
330
prisoners.
Despite the overwhelming international consensus opposing the death
penalty on mentally ill offenders, among the Supreme Court Justices there
is disagreement about the relevance and degree to which the Court should
rely on foreign laws and practices. In examining the constitutionality of the
punishment at issue in Trop, the Supreme Court looked at the mores in the
United States as well as the punishments other countries used in similar
circumstances. 331 However, several years later in Thompson, for example,
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented:
324. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty: An International Perspective,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=127&scid=20 (last visited Sept. 2, 2007)

(showing a graph of abolitionist and retentionist countries).
325. See id.
326. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 17, at 5 (quoting Res. 1999/61, supra
note 17).
327. Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2004/67, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67 (Apr. 21, 2004).
328. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
117, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68 (Dec. 23, 1997)
(preparedby Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly).
329. See supra note 89.

330. See, e.g., Letter from Eva Nowotny, Ambassador of Austria, Pekka Lintu,
Ambassador of Fin., and John Bruton, Head of Delegation, European Comm'n, to Governor
Timothy
M.
Kaine
of
Virginia
(n.d.),
available
at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/WaltonvVA2006.jpg.

The letter appears to

have been sent on May 24, 2006. European Union, Delegation of the European Comm'n to
the
USA,
EU
Policy
on
the
Death
Penalty,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/EUActionsUSCases2006.htm
(last visited
Sept. 2, 2007).
331. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion).

ATKINS, ROPER, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

2007]

We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of
America that we are expounding.... [W]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however
enlightened the Justices of [the Supreme] Court may think 332
them to be,
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.
In addition, Justice Scalia declared in his dissent in Atkins that "the
practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are
(thankfully) not always those of our people" are irrelevant to Eighth
Amendment analysis. 3 33 He even quoted his own dissent from Thompson
to support his argument that foreign laws have no place in American
courts.

334

Notably, however, from Atkins to Roper, reliance on international
consensus seems to have grown somewhat because discussion about the
views of the world community, which in Atkins was limited to a mere
footnote in the majority opinion, 3 35 leapt into the actual text of the Roper
opinion in a much lengthier discourse. 336 International opinion is still by
no means determinative of what the outcome of an issue before the Court
ought to be, as explicitly stated in both cases, 33 7 but nevertheless can be
persuasive and at the least can lend support to the Court's resolution on an
issue.3 38 In particular, if the Supreme Court ever examines whether it is

332. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J.,dissenting)
(opining that death penalty practices of foreign countries-which the majority referred to in
its opinion-should not be deemed relevant, particularly if there is not first a domestic
consensus).
333. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also
criticized the Court's decision, stating,
[T]he Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus'
must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted
professional and religious organizations, members of the so-called 'world
community,' and respondents to opinion polls.... [T]he views of professional and
religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are irrelevant. Equally
irrelevant are the practices of the 'world community.'
Id. at 347.
334. Id. at 348 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court
"should either profess its willingness to reconsider all ... matters in light of the views of
foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of the reasoned
basis of its decisions," and criticizing the majority decisions, stating that "[t]o invoke alien
law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned
decisionmaking, but sophistry").
335. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21 (noting that "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved").
336. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
337. See id. at 575 (stating that the opinions and practices of other nations are not
controlling because it is the Court's responsibility to interpret the Eighth Amendment);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21 ("Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their
consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to [the] conclusion that there
is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.").
338. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 ("It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution... to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
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appropriate to allow executions for mentally ill criminals, it may again look
to the international community for guidance. If it does, the Court will
likely determine that there is ample evidence of international and foreign
339
opposition to executing the mentally ill.
3. Consensus Among Professional Organizations
Among professional mental health organizations, there is abundant
evidence that they are opposed to the practice of imposing the death penalty
on mentally ill offenders.
In late 2004, the American Psychiatric
Association approved and released a position statement regarding
diminished responsibility in capital sentencing, which specifically
340
addressed an individual's mental health at the time of his or her offense.
It asserts,
Defendants shall not be sentenced to death or executed if, at the time of
the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that
significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature,
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational
judgment in relation to their34 conduct,
or (c) to conform their conduct to
1
the requirements of the law.

In the commentary following the statement above, the organization
explains that American laws, such as those permitting an insanity defense,
have long recognized that severe mental disorders diminish an individual's
responsibility for criminal acts and that execution may be cruel and
excessive punishment for such offenders. 342 It also points out that juries,
when faced with evidence of aggravating factors, have frequently devalued
evidence of a mental illness as a mitigating factor that diminishes
culpability. 34 3 Therefore, the American Psychiatric Association believes
that "[s]trong evidence of diminished responsibility due to mental illness
should preclude a death sentence and should not be weighed against
evidence in aggravation. '" 34 4
Furthermore, it opines that the Atkins
concerns and rationale for precluding the death penalty for mentally
retarded defendants are equally applicable to severely mentally ill
345
defendants.
In another position statement, the American Psychiatric Association
states, "Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of

freedom.").
339. See generally supra notes 315-30.
340. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diminished Responsibility in Capital Sentencing:

Position

Statement (2004), supra note 16.
341. Id. (adding that a "disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or
attributable solely to the acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not,
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for purposes of this provision").
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See id.

2007]

ATKINS, ROPER, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental retardation, dementia, or a
traumatic brain injury. ' 346 The association stated that its purpose in
adopting this position statement was to urge legislatures and courts to
extend the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins to dementia and traumatic
brain injury, which involve equivalent levels of impairments as mental
347
retardation.
A third position statement promulgated by the American Psychiatric
Association concerns mentally ill prisoners already on death row. 348 While
the primary focus of this Note is on people who are mentally ill at the time
of their crime, the association's position statement regarding mentally ill
death row inmates is nevertheless relevant because it demonstrates how
strongly the organization opposes permitting executions of mentally ill
offenders. It states,
A sentence of death should not be carried out if the prisoner has a mental
disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to
make a rational decision to forego or terminate post-conviction
proceedings available to challenge the validity of the conviction or
sentence; (ii) to understand or communicate pertinent information, or
otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific claims bearing on the
validity of the conviction or sentence that cannot be fairly resolved
without the prisoner's participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and
purpose of the punishment,349or to appreciate the reason for its imposition
in the prisoner's own case.

In the preface, the association acknowledges that not all psychiatrists
have the same beliefs about the "moral legitimacy and social utility" of
capital punishment but states that they are, however, "uniformly troubled by
the prospect of executing people whose offenses were linked to serious
350
mental disorders or whose mental disorders prevent a fair adjudication."
Because of such concerns, the American Psychiatric Association chose to
adopt this position statement. The association asserts that the only sensible
policy is to automatically commute a death sentence to a lesser punishment
3 51
once a prisoner has been found incompetent for execution.

346. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Death Sentences for Persons with Dementia or Traumatic
Brain Injury: Position Statement (2005), supra note 16.
347. See id. (stating that the position statement was developed in collaboration with the
ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty).
348. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Position Statement
(2005), supra note 16.

349. Id.
350. Id.

35 1. Id. The American Psychiatric Association reaches this conclusion based on
evidence that some courts have allowed the government to forcibly medicate incompetent
prisoners to restore them to be competent for execution. The organization considers such
treatment barbaric and a violation of fundamental ethical norms of the mental-health
professions. Id.
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Even before the Atkins and Roper decisions, another mental health
organization, the American Psychological Association, also put forward its
position on the death penalty and mentally ill offenders, declaring,
WHEREAS death penalty prosecutions may involve persons with serious
mental illness or mental retardation. Procedural problems, such as
assessing competency, take on particular importance in cases where the
death penalty is applied to such populations;...
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Psychological
Association:
Calls upon each jurisdiction in the United States that imposes capital
punishment not to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction
implements policies and procedures that can be shown through
psychological and other social
science research to ameliorate the
352
deficiencies identified above.
In the legal community, the ABA passed a resolution at its annual
conference on August 8, 2006, recommending that states stop sentencing
mentally ill or disabled criminals to death. 353 Without favoring or opposing
the death penalty, the ABA urged jurisdictions that permit capital
punishment to end their practice of executing or sentencing defendants to
death if "at the time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both
their intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior . . . resulting from
mental retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury." 354 Furthermore,
the ABA recommended that defendants who, at the time of their offense,
"had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their
capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their
conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law" should also not be
executed or given the death penalty. 355
The language used by the ABA in Recommendation 122A mirrors the
language used by the American Psychiatric Association in its various
position statements concerning mental illness and the death penalty. 356 The
American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association have both officially endorsed the ABA's resolution. 357 The
ABA states that its recommendations are, in part, meant to "prohibit
execution of persons with severe mental disabilities whose demonstrated

352. Am. Psychological Ass'n, supra note 16 (citations omitted).
353. See generally ABA Recommendation 122A, supra note 15; see also Scott Ehlers,
State Legislative Affairs Update, Champion, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 50 (discussing ABA
Recommendation 122A).
354. ABA Recommendation 122A, supra note 15, at 1.
355. Id.
356. Compare infra text accompanying notes 369-70 (discussing the ABA's language),
with supra text accompanying notes 341, 346 (discussing the American Psychiatric
Association's language in its position statements).
357. See ABA Recommendation 122A, supra note 15, at 3 & nn.2-3.
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impairments of mental and emotional functioning at the time of the 358
offense
would render a death sentence disproportionate to their culpability."
In the aggregate, the opinions and policy positions of respected legal and
mental health organizations provide abundant evidence of a professional
consensus in opposition to allowing the execution of severely mentally ill
offenders.
B. ProportionalityAnalysis: Deterrence and Retribution
Examining the proportionality of a punishment to an individual's
culpability is a vital part of the Eighth Amendment analysis. The Supreme
Court conducted proportionality examinations in both Roper3 59 and
Atkins. 360 Retribution and deterrence of violent crimes by potential
36
offenders are the two social purposes served by the death penalty. ' If
imposing the death penalty on a severely mentally ill defendant does not
demonstrably contribute to both retribution and deterrence, "it 'is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,'
'3 62
and hence an unconstitutional punishment.
The goal of retribution requires that an offender be punished in
proportion to his or her culpability. 363 In Roper, the Court confirmed that

once the diminished culpability of a class of offenders is recognized, "the
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser
force." 364 If, as with juveniles and mentally retarded offenders, courts
accept that severely mentally ill defendants also have diminished
culpability due to the nature of their illness (e.g., impairments in perception
and cognition, and frequent inability to control their impulses), justice is not
achieved by allowing mentally ill offenders to be sentenced to death-the
most extreme penal sanction for crimes. 365 Because capital punishment
assumes that a condemned criminal is fully culpable, any diminished
366
culpability results in the punishment of death being disproportionate.
367
Thus, the retributive goal fails.
Therefore, the diminished culpability of
mentally ill defendants ought to preclude them from the death penalty, since
allowing it would not further the goal of retribution.
With respect to deterrence, the theory is that the severity of capital
punishment will inhibit prospective criminals from committing violent
358. See id. at 5 (stating that the terms "disability" and "disorder"

are used

interchangeably and that only those offenders with severe mental disorders or disabilities
ought to be precluded from the death penalty).
359. See 543 U.S. 551, 571-73 (2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 162-66
(describing the Court's proportionality analysis in Roper).
360. See 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 99-106
(discussing the Atkins Court's analyses of deterrence and retribution).
361. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
362. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
363. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
364. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
365. See Izutsu, supra note 13, at 1021-22; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 51.
366. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 51.
367. See id.
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crimes. 368 The same argument made by the Court in Atkins about the weak
deterrent effect on mentally retarded defendants can also be made about
defendants with severe mental illness. In Atkins, the Court stated,
[T]he same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make [mentally
retarded] defendants less morally culpable-for example, the diminished
ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses-that also make it less
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution
as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
369
information.
People with severe mental illness manifest many of the same difficulties
that mentally retarded people struggle with, such as those the Atkins Court
listed above and those discussed in Part I.C. 1 of this Note. The inability of
persons with severe mental illness to control their impulses, to engage in
logical reasoning, and to control their conduct based on information about
the penal consequences of criminal action provides persuasive evidence that
the death penalty has little to no deterrent effect on mentally ill
offenders. 370 As one author writes, "The failure to make the critical
connection between conduct and legal consequences directly affects the
'3 71
capacity of the defendant [with severe mental illness] to be deterred.
Furthermore, a mentally ill defendant may not refrain from committing a
crime because cognitive impairments or delusions may lead to the false
belief that he or she is acting according to reality. 372 Moreover, in asserting
that the death penalty does not have a strong deterrent effect on severely
mentally ill defendants who are often unable to control their actions,
Amnesty International points out that "[c]ertainly no one believes that the
'3 73
death penalty can deter people from becoming psychotic.
More broadly, although there are still some politicians who support the
death penalty based on the theory of deterrence, the pure notion that the
374
death penalty has any deterrent effect is being questioned and criticized.
"[I]n a civilized society.., to deliberately kill an individual so that he may
serve as an example to others seems untenable." 3 75 A survey of former and
current presidents of the country's leading academic criminological
societies revealed that eighty-four percent of them did not believe that the

368. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.

369. Id.
370. See State v. Ketterer, 855 N.E.2d 48, 85 (Ohio 2006) (Lundberg Stratton, J.,

concurring) (stating that deterrence has little value as a reason for executing severely

mentally ill offenders who have diminished abilities to plan and control their impulses); see
also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 49-51; Izutsu, supra note 13, at 1021.
371. Izutsu, supra note 13, at 1021.

372. Id.
373. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 50.
374. See id. at 49-50.
375. Id. (stating that it seems unfair to use the death penalty to deter others because it
punishes the prisoner for the potential crimes of others rather than just what he or she has
done).
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death penalty was an actual deterrent to murder. 3 76 Only twelve percent of
the criminologists accepted the idea that the death penalty was a deterrent,
and four percent had no opinion.3 77 Interestingly, the South, which is
responsible for eighty percent of all executions in the country also happens
to have the highest murder rates. 37 8 The Northeast, in contrast, which
accounts for less than one percent of all executions, has the lowest murder
rates. 379 Furthermore, a poll conducted in 1995 on police chiefs in the
United States revealed that the majority of them reject the notion that the
death penalty is effective as a law enforcement tool to reduce violent crime
or, in other words, to deter capital crimes. 380 Additionally, among other
methods of trying to reduce violent crime, expanding the death penalty was
thought to be the least effective method, supported by only one percent of
the police chiefs. 38' Such statistics make one question whether the death
penalty is in fact meeting its goal of deterring others from committing
capital crimes.
III. IS

THE END OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN SIGHT
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL?

The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether mentally
ill defendants ought to be categorically exempt from being sentenced to
death. Collectively, the cases examined in Parts I.A and I.B set forth the
judicial history leading to categorical exclusions from the death penalty for
certain other groups in Atkins and Roper, namely mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders. Looking at the development of the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence, 382 it is evident that the Court is moving in the
direction of narrowing the applicability of the death penalty so as to
preclude offenders with diminished culpability. Based on this trend, the
Court may again exclude other categories of people if it deems it necessary
according to its constitutional interpretations as well as evolving standards
of decency. 383 Applying the Supreme Court's analysis of youth in Roper
and mental retardation in Atkins to current facts about mental illness, there
is strong support for the notion that, like juveniles and mentally retarded
offenders, severely mentally ill criminals ought also to receive categorical
384
protection from the death penalty.
376. See DPIC Facts, supra note 236, at 3.
377. See id. at 3.
378. See id.
379. See id. This Note only points out the correlation between death penalty and murder
rates in different regions of the United States and does not assume that either is the cause of
the other.
380. See id. at 4.
381. See id. (listing methods such as reducing drug abuse and having longer jail sentences
as being more effective for reducing violent crime rates).
382. See generally supra Part I.A-B.
383. See supra text accompanying note 24.
384. See supra Part L.C (defining severe mental illness, and explaining why the death
penalty inquiry in this Note was limited to a narrow category of only the most serious mental
illnesses).
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Experts in the legal, psychological, and psychiatric professions 385 as well
as the U.N., foreign countries, and other international groups have
presented myriad reasons for why persons with serious mental illness
should not be subject to capital punishment. 386 Observing that such
professional organizations, transnational bodies, and nations have in large
387
part been disapproving of permitting executions of mentally ill criminals,
this Note concludes that a consensus exists among them that merits a more
limited application of the death penalty and perhaps even a complete
abolition of the death penalty in the future.
Despite the overwhelming consensus of the international community,
foreign nations, and legal and mental health organizations, it is still unlikely
that the Supreme Court will decide to immediately exclude mentally ill
criminals from the death penalty. This is mainly due to the fact that state
counting was the most objective and therefore most significant indicator in
Atkins and Roper of a national consensus, and according to this Note's
analysis in Part II.A. L.a, there is only tenuous evidence of state death
penalty laws providing categorical exemptions for the mentally ill.388
Undoubtedly, current practices of juries 389 and courts in sentencing, 390
examples of clemencies for mentally ill death row inmates, 39 1 opinions of
state justices,3 92 moratoriums, 3 93 and public opinion about executing the
severely mentally ill 394 are all relevant in assessing whether standards of
decency are evolving in the United States about the appropriateness of
imposing capital punishment on the mentally ill. As Justice Lundberg
Stratton pointed out, however, without the requisite evidence of state
legislation outlawing the practice, it is difficult for judges to impose bans
on executing mentally ill defendants based on other persuasive reasons
offered by foreign countries, relevant expert organizations, and the
39 5
American public.
Given the strong opinions of the world community, mental health
experts, and legal organizations, and the public's changing views about
permitting mentally ill offenders to be sentenced to death, legislatures and
courts in death penalty states ought to evaluate existing statutes using the
framework of Atkins and Roper. As a starting point, they can examine
385. See generally supra Part II.A.3.

386. See generally supra Part II.A.2.
387. See generally supra Part II.A.2-3.

388. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Atkins Court's
investigation of state legislation and its emphasis on looking to state laws as objective
evidence of a consensus); see also supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's study of state legislation in Roper); Part II.A. L.a (analyzing whether there is a
national legislative consensus among states concerning mental illness and the death penalty).
389. See supra Part II.A. 1.c.
390. See supra Part II.A. 1.b.i.
391. See supra Part II.A.l.b.ii.
392. See supra Part II.A. 1.b.iv.

393. See supra Part II.A. 1.b.iii.
394. See supra Part II.A. 1.c.

395. See supra text accompanying notes 264-84.
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whether such a punishment achieves the proper penological purposes of
deterrence and retribution for mentally ill offenders. 396 Enactment of
appropriate legislation protecting the narrow class of severely mentally ill
offenders from execution should be considered if there are sufficient
reasons to believe that the characteristics of mentally ill offenders render
them less culpable and less susceptible to deterrence than the average
capital criminal. In addition, with respect to retribution, which requires that
the severity of a punishment be commensurate with the offender's
culpability, state legislatures can use the analyses of Roper and Atkins to
investigate and determine whether mentally ill offenders have diminished
culpability. Given the inability of many severely mentally ill people to
control their behavior or thoughts, this Note argues that the penological
goals of the death penalty are not met by permitting such people to be
executed. States that perform the proportionality analysis outlined in Part
II.B will likely conclude that the death penalty is a disproportionately harsh
punishment for mentally ill offenders, which does not advance the states'
goals of proper retribution and deterrence. If states determine that neither
retributive nor deterrent goals are satisfied by permitting the mentally ill to
be executed, the states' justifications become significantly weaker for
allowing the imposition of the most extreme criminal sanction on offenders
with diminished culpability. Therefore, they will be compelled to reform
their laws accordingly.
At the present time, evidence is lacking of a national consensus in state
legislation that would suffice for the Supreme Court to grant a categorical
397
exclusion for severely mentally ill criminals from the death penalty.
Although the current legislative landscape 398 may render the Supreme
Court, and courts in general, unable to provide severely mentally ill
defendants with categorical protection, state legislatures do have the ability
to examine factors such as those discussed above. 399 In other words,
notwithstanding the state legislation obstacle which courts would
encounter, state legislative bodies have wide discretion to pass and amend
laws concerning the matter. Legislatures therefore ought to fashion more
protective laws for the courts to apply based on proportionality analyses
and social, professional, and international opinions condemning the death
40 0
penalty as a form of punishment for the mentally ill.
This Note does not argue that mentally ill offenders should be exempt
from severe criminal sanctions. It merely points out that nearly all of the
same arguments that were offered and accepted by the Supreme Court
regarding the diminished culpability of juveniles and mentally retarded
persons, and the deterrent and retributive effects of imposing the death
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See generally supra Part II.B.
See generally Part II.A. l.a.
See generally supra Part II.A. l.a.
See generally supra Part I.A.l.b-c.
See supra text accompanying notes 283-84; see generally Part I.
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penalty on such defendants in Roper and Atkins, can also be made
convincingly about the severely mentally ill.
In the words of Thomas Jefferson,
"[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and
opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must
40 1
advance also, and keep pace with the times."
CONCLUSION

An end to the death penalty for mentally ill offenders is not immediately
likely given the dearth of state laws protecting the mentally ill, which are
necessary to constitute a national consensus. However, for opponents of
the death penalty, it may actually be good that the Supreme Court will not
soon carve out another death penalty exception. In fact, in the long run,
advocating for the categorical exemption may be counterproductive to their
goal of eradicating the penalty in this country. While opponents may think
that chopping away in small increments at the death penalty is the way to
ultimately abolish it, proponents of capital punishment can argue that each
exception made by the Supreme Court for a certain class of people actually
prunes the death penalty and mends its flaws. In effect, another categorical
exception could strengthen proponents' defense of the death penalty
because it would provide them with ammunition to contend that capital
punishment laws are being perfected and becoming fairer by building in
safeguards. Ironically, an exemption for the mentally ill could make the
death penalty a longer lasting and more established institution in this
country.
Therefore, while opponents of the death penalty may at first be
disheartened to learn that an exception for the mentally ill is not likely
imminent, they should be pleased to know that this is not a victory for death
penalty supporters either. There is growing disapproval of the death
penalty, particularly for mentally ill offenders, among the international
community, the American public, and numerous organizations with
germane expertise. As such, and in light of new developments in death
penalty jurisprudence, the time is ripe for death penalty laws with respect to
mentally ill individuals to be reexamined by courts and legislatures through
the lenses of Atkins and Roper and altered in accordance with evolving
standards of decency.

401. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 409 n.7 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 40-42 (Memorial ed. 1904)); see also State v. Ketterer, 855

N.E.2d 48, 87 (Ohio 2006) (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring) (concluding the opinion with
Thomas Jefferson's quote from Furman).

